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RECONFIGURING THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
THOMAS B. METZLOFF*
INTRODUCTION
The widespread interest in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has
resulted in a proliferation of techniques and strategies, each promising
important contributions to the fair and efficient resolution of disputes.1
Judicial policy makers are understandably interested in reaping the bene-
fits offered by particularly effective ADR methods. Faced with limited
resources to develop and implement ADR programs, however, policy
makers must choose among competing approaches-a choice often made
difficult by limited information on how particular processes have
performed.
The difficulties in analyzing ADR initiatives are particularly acute
with the summary jury trial (SJT), an ADR method developed in the
federal courts in the early 1980s. As described in the literature, the SJT
is targeted at cases that cannot be resolved by traditional settlement
processes.2 In an SJT, an abbreviated version of the dispute is submitted
to a jury, which renders an advisory verdict intended to assist the liti-
gants in reevaluating the possibility of settlement. Judging by some ac-
counts, the SJT has enjoyed a fair measure of success in some federal
courts, and is regularly touted as a useful addition to state court ADR
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1. For a general review of ADR techniques and discussion of issues relating to their develop-
ment and use, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); Jethro K. Lieber-
man & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHIi. L.
REv. 424 (1986); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary
Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 809 (1988) ("Mhe ideal system will require deploying a
whole battery of dispute-resolving mechanisms, variously directed, variously driven and variously
employed.").
2. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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offerings. Recently, however, critics have asserted that the process is un-
reliable, conceptually unsound, and arguably illegal. Although these op-
posing accounts might be reconciled by well-designed studies, apparent
difficulties with conducting empirical research have resulted in a notable
lack of evidence on the SJT's performance.
Although generally critical of the SJT as presently conceived, this
Article is not intended as another denouncement of the process. To the
contrary, its central contention is that this ADR method, once freed
from artificial limitations placed upon it by its earliest users, can fulfill a
distinct and useful role. Part I describes the philosophy and history of
the SJT, focusing particularly on how the process is intended to foster
settlements and evidence concerning its use. Part II presents a detailed
account of an effort by the North Carolina state court system to use
SJTs. The description of this experimental program-one of the first
state court attempts to harness the SJT's potential-reveals several unex-
pected difficulties in realizing its supposed benefits. The most notable
finding was the almost total lack of interest among litigants in employing
the process in its traditional non-binding format. Although this low level
of use may reflect design flaws in the program or its implementation, it is
also possible that few state court cases are well suited to the process or
that the non-binding approach is inherently defective. The suitability of
state court cases is further explored in Part III, where a separate exami-
nation of the pool of trial cases in medical malpractice disputes (an im-
portant part of most state courts' trial dockets) reveals that the SJT offers
only marginal potential benefits.
Part IV revisits the theory of the SJT. A noteworthy aspect of the
North Carolina program was the interest among litigants in using (and a
corresponding willingness by the court system to permit such use of) the
summary jury as a binding ADR method. Part IV argues that further
attention to the summary jury trial's potential as a binding process is
warranted. Although at first blush binding SJTs may seem inconsistent
with its purpose and structure, a binding approach overcomes most of
the current criticisms of the SJT. Accordingly, it offers a promising
ADR opportunity for resolving certain high-stakes disputes.
I. THE CLASSIC SUMMARY JuRY TRIAL: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRACTICE
In what this Article will refer to as the "classic" SJT, the opposing
attorneys briefly present their respective cases before a jury that renders a
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non-binding verdict.3 To minimize the parties' expense and the use of
court time, the SJT is greatly abbreviated in comparison to a traditional
trial; common descriptions of the process suggest that a typical SJT-
targeted at cases that usually require a week or more to try-could be
completed in one day or less.4 This economy is achieved by using various
procedural shortcuts, such as restricting questioning during jury selec-
tion, minimizing evidentiary objections, omitting marginal evidence, and
curtailing jury instructions. The most important element-usually con-
sidered the SJT's sine qua non-is the use of attorney summaries of evi-
dence in lieu of live testimony.5 In this way, the classic SJT imitates, but
hardly replicates, a traditional jury trial.
6
3. A useful summary of a paradigm non-binding SIT is provided in the following quotation
from the first article describing the process:
The summary jury trial is a half-day proceeding in which attorneys for opposing par-
ties are each given one hour to summarize their cases before a six-member jury. Basically,
introduction of evidence is limited, and witnesses are excluded from the proceeding. After
the evidence has been presented and the judge provides a short explanation of the law, the
jury retires and either presents a consensus verdict or, if no consensus can be reached,
reveals anonymous individual juror views. The jury's verdict is purely advisory, unless the
parties agree to be bound by the verdict. The main purpose of the procedure is to provide
parties with an insight into the way a trial jury would view the case without the expendi-
ture of time and money required for a full trial.
Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 43, 43
(1980); see also Hugh W. Brenneman & Edward Wesoloski, Blueprint for a Summary Jury Trial, 65
MICH. B.J. 888 (1986); Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Meth-
ods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 470-71 (1984).
4. In practice, there would appear to be no established or preferred length; SJTs have been as
short as a few hours or as long as a week or more. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43
(E.D. Ky. 1988) (involving a five-day SJT). See generally James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in
State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 213, 229 (1989) (table 5) (noting that 86% of Florida state court SJTs
were conducted in a half day, as compared to only eight percent of Florida federal court SJTs).
5. See, eg., S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. ON. L. REv. 829, 829 (1986); see
also Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 725, 751 (1989) (noting that "allowing live
testimony seems to be beyond the scope of the proceeding"). For descriptions of the types of evi-
dence allowed and related restrictions, see Thomas D. Lambros, Summary Jury Trials, LITIO., Fall
1986, at 52, 53. In fact, different judges have employed a variety of formats, including differing
approaches to limiting evidence. See D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FED-
ERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 68-76 (1986) (discussing the flexibility of SJT formats); Gerald L. Maat-
man, Jr., The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 464-65 (1988) (same).
6. For an interesting analysis of the qualitative differences between an SIT and a conventional
trial, concluding that the SJT should be used cautiously pending further testing to understand the
impact of the differences between it and a traditional trial, see Joan K. Archer Rowland, Comment,
Communication and Psychology Variables: Reasons to Reject the Summary Jury Trial as an Alter-
nate Dispute Resolution Technique, 39 KAN. L. REv. 1071 (1991).
Vol. 41:806] SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
A. The History of the Classic Summary Jury Trial
Unlike other ADR methods whose roots extend back decades if not
centuries, the SJT is of recent origin. First used in 1980, the SJT is the
innovation of Judge Thomas Lambros, a federal district court judge in
Ohio.7 Rather than relying on litigants to volunteer, Judge Lambros, as
well as many other federal judges interested in testing the process, typi-
cally compelled participation based upon the assumptions that judges
were best able to identify suitable disputes and that the same dynamics
that prevented litigants from settling would likely interfere with their
agreeing to the use of this or any other ADR method.
8
The SJT quickly came to occupy an enviable niche among ADR
adherents. Enhanced by active judicial support (which at times ap-
proached evangelical fervor), the SJT was almost immediately accepted
7. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model
for a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 798-804 (1989). If one is willing to stretch the conception
of a summary trial, a predecessor of sorts was considered in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1
(1899). In Hof, the Supreme Court approved a District of Columbia rule that required litigants to
try their case first to a jury presided over by a lay court official, but required that the litigants be
afforded the right to a trial de novo before a jury presided over by a "regular" judge. See id at 41-
43.
8. See, eg., William E. Craco, Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges
to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAm L. REv. 483, 499 (1988) (suggesting that
the "major obstacle to widespread use of SJTs are the suspicions of unwary practitioners, unaware of
the benefits of the procedure," thus justifying mandatory judicial referrals). Not all federal judges
mandate the procedure; several judges merely suggest its use. See, eg., Associated Pa. Constructors
v. Jannetta, 738 F. Supp. 891, 895 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (providing that the parties shall notify the court
if interested in using an SJT according to the court's suggested format); Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625
F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D. Conn. 1986) (requesting parties to consider the use of an SJT because of the
"many factual uncertainties involved in this case... and the apparent absence of independent pro-
gress towards settlement").
SJT proponents have suggested that authority for mandating its use can be found primarily in
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the court's power to conduct pre-
trial conferences, as well as in the Court's inherent powers to control its docket. See Lambros &
Shunk, supra note 3, at 51-52; Glenn Newman, Note, The Summary Jury Trial as a Method of
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 1990 U. ILL. L. Rav. 177, 193-95. Courts and commenta-
tors have also relied on (1) local rules authorizing SJTs promulgated under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83, see McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-46 (E.D. Ky. 1988), and (2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), which permits the use of advisory juries as additional sources
of authority. See Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. Rv. 1363, 1368
(1987) (describing the SIT as an "innovative use of the advisory jury" procedure). For a useful
discussion of the asserted bases for judicial power to mandate the SIT, see Charles F. Webber, Note,
Mandatory Summary Jury Trial. Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. Can. L. Rav. 1495 (1989). See gener-
ally Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues,
68 OR. L. REv. 487 (1989) (analyzing various constitutional issues relating to the use of ADR,
including the SIT). For commentary dealing with the issue of the advisability of mandatory SIT
referrals, see infra note 28.
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within the lexicon of the ADR movement and its use became common-
place in a few federal district courts.9 Its popularity is generally attrib-
uted to its unique reliance on lay jurors, 10 although it is also probably the
case that judges and litigants are more comfortable with its format be-
cause it relies more on traditional adversarial presentation than do other
ADR methods (such as mediation) that seek to substitute a different dis-
pute resolution orientation.1 In addition, the SJT's quick rise through
the ranks of accepted ADR methods was also attributable to the fact that
it is one of the few alternative procedures specifically designed for com-
plex cases.1
2
9. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 68 (noting that as of mid-1980s, more than 25 federal judges
had used the process); Lambros, supra note 7, at 802 (estimating that a total of 1000 SJTs have been
conducted in federal and state courts).
10. As noted in a recent judicial decision, the SJT "is the only dispute resolution technique
which uses the input of a jury of laymen as fact finders. It is this facet of the SJT which permits the
parties, not the attorneys, to believe that their story has been told, and a decision reached by an
objective body." Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D. Minn.
1988). This same feature has been regularly noted by commentators as a major advantage of the
process. See, eg., Spiegel, supra note 5, at 834 (arguing that the SJT verdict is "more realistic and a
better reflection of community attitudes" than other ADR methods such as arbitration).
11. See Rosenberg, supra note 1 (discussing ADR approaches in relation to the adversarial
process and noting how most court-annexed methods maintain important elements of the adversarial
system); Nina J. Spiegel, Comment, The Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in Federal Court: Founda-
tionally Flawed, 16 PEPP. L. REv. S251, S254-55 (1989) (noting that the SJT process appeals to "the
emotional sense of justice, consistent with the American justice system's concepts of ventilation and
confrontation in a structured adversarial system"). Moreover, there are other aspects of the SJT that
make it less threatening to those trial attorneys comfortable with the current adversarial system. For
example, it has never been suggested that the SJT result should be admissible at a subsequent, con-
ventional trial, or that the court system should impose a penalty on litigants who insist upon a
traditional trial. Cf. Golann, supra note 8, at 545-46 (detailing penalty provisions and admissibility
rules associated with other ADR programs).
12. See Timothy Kratz, Comment, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Complex Litigation, 57
UMKC L. REV. 839, 840 (1989) (noting the utility of the SJT in complex cases as opposed to
"[t]ypical alternative mechanisms such as mediation and family or neighborhood justice centers
[which] are not sophisticated enough to handle such cases, especially considering that complex cases
often necessitate sufficient discovery to achieve settlement").
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SJT advocates billed it as accurate, 13 useful for a wide variety of case
types, 14 easy to implement because it required little additional adminis-
trative support,15 and cost effective for both the parties and the court.
16
Indeed, its proponents went so far as to hail it as a "no risk" procedure
because, even if the parties did not settle, the efforts invested in the SJT
would help in preparation for the full trial.17 Spurred by glowing reports
of SJT's apparent success in the federal setting, state courts expressed
interest in the process in the mid-1980s.18 This initial wave of support
13. See Recent Developments, Procedure, Summary Jury Trials in the United States District
Court, Western District of Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 214, 216 (1984) (comparing SJT verdicts in
Oklahoma with subsequent trial results and finding that they were consistent).
14. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 69 ("Judges are finding that summary jury trial is useful
in a broad range of case types."); Brenneman & Wesoloski, supra note 3, at 888 (noting wide use of
the process because "[w]e have not detected ... any readily discernible pattern of cases best suited
for a SJT"); Lambros, supra note 7, at 799 ("My experience has shown that the summary jury trial is
useful for all kinds of cases. While I initially submitted non-complex matters to summary juries, I
have seen the procedure work very effectively for product liability, antitrust, patent and copyright
infringement, and employment cases.").
15. See Celeste F. Bremer & W. Scott Simmer, One Day in Court: Suggestions for Implement-
ing Summary Jury Trials in Iowa, 36 DRAKE L. Rav. 297, 313 (1986-1987) (asserting that the SJT
represents "one of the most promising of the alternatives available because it requires no additional
training or resources to implement").
16. See, ag., Lambros, supra note 7, at 801 (estimating that the court saved over $90,000 in
juror fees by conducting 60 SJTs in lieu of traditional trials); Spiegel, supra note 5, at 834 (reporting
that eight SJTs requiring only 17 days of trial time would have required 135 days if tried
conventionally).
17. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 75 (noting that lawyers will be better prepared even if
no settlement occurs); WILLIAM D. QUARLES ET AL., SUMMARY ADJUDICATION: DISPOSITIVE
MOTIONS AND SUMMARY TRIALS 247 (1991) (quoting Judge Lambros as saying that even if no
settlement occurs, "the lawyers are able to come to a stipulation with respect to various facts that
would otherwise be in dispute" so that "[t]he actual trial... is reduced by at least the amount of
time taken by the summary jury trial, or more. It enhances the quality of the trial itself."). In fact,
any observed impact on the conventional trial may be a function of other pre-trial managerial re-
quirements imposed by the judge who mandated the SJT. See Negin v. City of Mentor, 601 F. Supp.
1502, 1506 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (ordering that if the SJT did not resolve dispute, the parties must
prepare and exchange written summaries of testimony in part because the exercise of preparing the
summaries "tends to distill out the essence of each witness's testimony").
18. Use of SJTs in state courts has been reported as early as 1983. See Alfini, supra note 4, at
215 (noting use of an SIT in 1983 in a Florida state court); see also Bixler v. J.C. Penney Co., 376
N.W.2d 209, 214 (Minn. 1985) (referencing the use of an SJT in a Minnesota state court). See
generally Bremer & Simmer, supra note 15, at 315 (suggesting that SJTs "could prove to be an
invaluable tool in the extrajudicial arsenal that Iowa courts may utilize to resolve burgeoning
caseloads"). At least three states have statutory provisions that expressly allow for the use of SJTs in
their state court systems. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1154 to -1157 (1989); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 154.026 (West Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.1 to -576.3 (Michie
Supp. 1991). Other states have relied on local court initiatives. See infra note 51 (discussing evi-
dence of the use of SITs in state courts).
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perhaps crested when the Judicial Conference of the United States for-
mally endorsed the "experimental use" of SJTs a mere four years after
the process was first employed. 19
Criticisms soon surfaced, however. Beginning with an article by
Judge Richard Posner that questioned both its utility and ethical propri-
ety,20 the SJT has been subjected to a series of increasingly virulent at-
tacks that have exposed a number of weaknesses thought to be inherent
in the SJT.21 Critics, for example, have detailed the difficulties a sum-
mary jury has in assessing witness credibility given its reliance on law-
yers' summaries of evidence. 22 Similarly, some have questioned whether
19. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (1984) (endorsing the "experimental use of
summary jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of
potentially lengthy civil jury cases"), cited in Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335 (S.D.
Il. 1987). The initial draft of the resolution provided:
rTlhe Judicial Conference endorses the use of summary jury trials, only with the voluntary
consent of the parties, as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable
settlement of lengthy civil jury cases. With proper authorization by local rules, summary
jury trials are recommended to District Courts for consideration as an optional device.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE
ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM AGENDA G-13, at 4 (1984), cited in Strandell, 115
F.R.D. at 334-35 (emphasis added in Strandell). The language dealing with voluntary consent-
which was inconsistent with actual judicial practice-was dropped.
20. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986). Posner's specific con-
cerns about the SJT focus on three major points. First, he questions whether the SJT has contrib-
uted to a reduction in court backlogs in those districts in which it has been widely used. For
example, Posner found that although the number of civil trials in the Northern District of Ohio
(which employed the SJT regularly) had in fact declined, this trend began prior to the time that SJTs
were first employed. Id. at 379. Second, he challenged whether the process, at least when mandated
by federal courts, was authorized by the existing rules. Id. at 385. Third, he questioned the ethics of
not informing summary juries that their results would not be binding. Id. at 386-87.
21. See Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment
of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REv. 87 (1990):
[Because] rules of evidence in an SJT are so relaxed as to be nearly nonexistent, and be-
cause lawyers may have only one or two hours to summarize what in a normal trial would
take several weeks or more, one must ask whether the jury verdict in the proceeding is at
all valuable.... Instead of judging the credibility of witnesses, the jury assesses the credi-
bility of the attorneys, which might also lead to a skewed verdict.
Id. at 99; see also Rowland, supra note 6, at 1079 (suggesting that because of the differences in how
information is communicated to the summary jury, "there is little guarantee that a summary pro-
ceeding lasting a few hours can ensure accuracy and reliability at a level similar to a full-length
trial"). For a colorful tirade against the SIT process, see John Feikens, The Civil Jury-An Endan-
gered Species, 20 U. MICH. J.L REF. 789, 797 (1987) (labeling the SJT a "creature of the devil" that,
because of its lack of procedural protections, constitutes a form of "Russian roulette"). These criti-
cisms have been recently fueled by a growing list of what appear to be aberrant SJT results. See
infra note 43.
22. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 40 (1987) (arguing that allowing SJTs in cases presenting substantial issues of veracity such
as intent or conspiracy "institutionalizes inaccuracy and harms dispute resolution quality"); Maat-
man, supra note 5, at 483 (asserting that the summary jury process prevents the jury "from being
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it is appropriate to permit unprepared attorneys to participate in an SJT
where they might benefit from seeing their opponent's presentation prior
to the subsequent "real" trial.2 3 Questions have also been raised as to
whether the process generates any significant cost savings to the par-
ties.2 4 As a result, critics have suggested that, contrary to its billing as a
"no risk" procedure, the SJT might actually impede settlements or en-
courage settlements that are of low quality.2 5 In addition, even conced-
ing that the process may prove effective in particular disputes, it has been
suggested that other ADR methods-particularly court-ordered arbitra-
tion or more active judicial management of cases-would achieve compa-
rable results with less cost to both litigants and the courts.
26
These criticisms have been reflected in a series of recent legal chal-
lenges directed against the SJT. For example, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has held that federal judges do not have the authority
to mandate the use of SJTs-a damning blow to the classic SJT theory,
which depends in large part upon active judicial involvement in identify-
ing appropriate cases and requiring participation to overcome litigant
reticence.27 Commentators are sharply divided on the advisability of
able to reach an accurate and just assessment of credibility"). Even judges who have used the pro-
cess regularly have recognized this concern. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 835. But see Bremer &
Simmer, supra note 15, at 313 (noting that the "cathartic experience of [parties having] their day in
court" makes SJTs useful even in "swearing contest[s]").
23. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 70 (noting reports that "the procedure does not work
well when lawyers are inexperienced or unprepared"); Maatman, supra note 5, at 486 (noting that
the use of SJTs "by ill-prepared counsel motivated by a desire to gain a strategical advantage at the
subsequent full trial on the merits will only reduce the reliability of the advisory verdict and destroy
the procedure's perceived theoretical efficacy to promote settlement").
24. See Maatman, supra note 5, at 482 (noting that "the parties may incur costs comparable to
preparation for a full trial, even in circumstances where settlement is achieved"); Sherilyn Peterson,
Summary Jury Trial Strategies, LrrIG., Spring 1990, at 31, 62 (noting that "an SJT can easily double
the cost of pretrial preparation without resulting in settlement"); see also Federal Reserve Bank v.
Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D. Minn. 1988) (noting objections by counsel to judicial
referral to an SJT on the grounds that it would cost approximately $50,000 per party to prepare for
and conduct the procedure).
25. See, e.g., Afini, supra note 4, at 225 (noting that receipt of a zero verdict in a case in which
defendant had made a prior offer may undercut settlement negotiations because the defendant will
retract or lower any offers that may have been made prior to the SJT); Posner, supra note 20, at 387
(suggesting that a corporation that loses an SJT may be forced to settle on potentially unfavorable
terms). As a partial counter to these considerations, some judges require the summary jury to assess
potential damages even if it finds for the defendant. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 836.
26. See, eg., United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803, 808 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 1990) ("Besides
placing an added hardship on the parties, it remains unclear what the process has to offer over a
traditional settlement conference between the parties and the judge."); Posner, supra note 20, at 382
(suggesting that other settlement methods should be explored because of "how lavish the summary
jury trial is with the judge's time: he spends a whole day trying to settle one case").
27. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); see also supra note 8.
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mandatory referrals. 28 A more recent district court opinion went further
and held that the federal courts have no authority to summon a summary
jury even if requested by the parties.29 To be sure, other decisions have
praised the process while upholding the courts' power to mandate its
use;30 indeed, Congress has recently expressly authorized federal district
courts to utilize the process as part of the development of comprehensive
case management plans. 31
28. Compare Maatman, supra note 5, at 486 (claiming that making the process mandatory in
cases in which one side is not prepared "will only reduce the reliability of the advisory verdict and
destroy the procedure's perceived theoretical efficacy to promote settlement") and Daniel K.
O'Toole, Comment, The Catch-22 of Mandatory Summary Jury Trials, 1990 J. Disp. REsOL. 135,
147 (declaring that mandating SJTs is "doomed to failure due either to the discovery rules protecting
information from disclosure prior to trial or practical consideration as to the adversarial position
parties often occupy prior to trial") with Marcus, supra note 5, at 750 (questioning the result in
Strandell by noting that "[m]aking litigants go through [an SJT] is qualitatively different from club-
bing them into accepting a specific compromise"); Craco, supra note 8, at 499 (arguing that because
"the major obstacle to widespread use of SJTs are the suspicions of unwary practitioners, unaware of
the benefits of the procedure," mandating the use of SJTs will "not only improve the chances that
the particular dispute will be resolved efficiently, but increase the number of practitioners who will
feel comfortable with the procedure in the future"); Newman, supra note 8, at 199 (arguing that if
Strandell prevails, "the result will be the destruction of the summary jury trial, not merely its modifi-
cation") and Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial Guidelines for Ensuring Fair
and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1104 (1990) (recommending that legislatures au-
thorize mandatory SJTs while providing certain safeguards to guarantee their fairness).
29. See Hume v. M & C Mgmt., 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see also Charles W.
Hatfield, Comment, The Summary Jury Trial: Who Will Speak for the Jurors?, 1991 J. Disp.
RESOL. 151, 157-59 (criticizing Hume and noting that if it is upheld, parties would be forced to
conduct SJTs privately, which raises a number of serious difficulties--such as ensuring random se-
lection ofjurors-thus likely resulting in the "death of the summary jury trial in federal court"); cf
United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that jurors summoned for
criminal trial must be discharged due to undue influence of having been exposed to the SJT process).
Following the decision in Exum, Judge Lambros issued a general order relating to juror utilization
that expressly permitted use of jurors in summary jury proceedings. See United States v. Exum, 748
F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio 1990). In response, Judge Battisti, author of Exum, perceiving an unwar-
ranted interference with his judicial authority, refused to conduct any jury trials until a new jury
wheel was drawn. Id
30. Those courts finding the power to mandate the use of SJTs focus on the need to overcome
attorney reluctance to utilize novel ADR methods. For example, in Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-
Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D. Minn. 1988), the court noted:
Parties and attorneys are often and understandably reluctant to accept and participate in
procedures outside the traditional norm. It is often difficult to focus the attention of coun-
sel and litigants on settlement as an alternative means of resolving a case. The need to
compel the parties to address settlement is an integral aspect of the docket management
function of the court in this era of complex, protracted litigation.
For other positive assessments of the process, see McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.
Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
31. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
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B. The SJT and the Settlement Process
The universally acknowledged goal of the SJT is to promote settle-
ment. 32 The process was judicially inspired by the perceived need to ad-
dress the problem of court overload and delay; it promised to resolve
intractable disputes that threatened to consume large amounts of scarce
judicial resources.3 3 Explaining how SJTs actually promote settlement,
however, has not been rigorously pursued. As a starting point, judicial
proponents exhibit considerable faith in existing settlement processes.
SJTs are not intended to interrupt or supplant these current approaches,
but are designed for cases shown to be intractable34-an attitude proba-
bly justified more by the perceived necessity of avoiding trial than any
inherent confidence in the underlying equities of current settlement prac-
tices. 35 Once focused on this core of settlement-resistant disputes, the
SJT's settlement enhancing powers have been explained under at least
four different theories.
32. See eg., Alfini, supra note 4, at 234 (stating that the SJT is "not a freestanding dispute
resolution device," but "is merely an adjunct to settlement negotiations between the parties"). In-
deed, SJTs have been ordered closed to the public to better facilitate settlement negotiations. See
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting news-
paper's request to observe SiT because "[alt every turn the summary jury trial is designed to facili-
tate pretrial settlement of the litigation, much like a settlement conference"), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1033 (1989).
33. See Bremer & Simmer, supra note 15, at 298 ("[E]conomy of judicial time requires that
some attempt be made by the court to explore the possibility of settlement with counsel and their
clients" in complex cases); Newman, supra note 8, at 181 (noting that the SiT provides judges with
"a weapon... to fight backlogged dockets"); cf Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Ky.
1987) ("TIhe exigencies of modem dockets demand the adoption of novel and imaginative means
[such as the SiT] lest the courts, inundated by a tidal wave of cases, fail in their duty to provide a
just and speedy disposition of every case.").
34. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 70 ("If summary jury trial is to be cost-effective, it must
be reserved for cases that are unlikely to settle on their own or with less demanding court assist-
ance."). The SiT's focus on intractable cases implies that it is not to be used until discovery is
completed and the case is ready for trial, because it is only at this point that a judge could be
reasonably confident that the case would not settle on its own accord. See Thomas D. Lambros, The
Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1363, 1376 (1984). But see Com-
pressed Gas Corp. v. United States Steel Corp., 857 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that trial
court's decision to permit additional discovery following sJr was not an abuse of discretion). Obvi-
ously, this perspective is from that of the courts, not necessarily that of litigants who might benefit if
an SiT were used to resolve a dispute early in the litigation process even if it would have settled prior
to trial. Perhaps in response to criticisms that awaiting the completion of discovery limits potential
cost savings, Judge Lambros has recently suggested earlier use of STrs. See QUARLES, supra note
17, at 246.
35. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (questioning recent judi-
cial initiatives designed to promote settlement, including the development of various ADR methods);
Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 55 (noting the importance of
addressing the qualitative nature of settlement).
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1. The Jury Preview Effect. The most often cited justification for
the SJT is that the attorneys will afford the surrogate verdict substantial
weight in their settlement calculus. Because of the high cost of trial and
its attendant risks, most cases settle if the parties have reasonably similar
views of the likely odds of prevailing and the probable damages that
might be awarded. Trial often represents an unnecessary failure of nego-
tiation in which the attorneys (who for the moment are assumed to be
primarily responsible for formulating settlement strategies) have mis-
valued the case.36 SJT proponents surmise that litigants can maintain
differing assessments, even in the light of accumulating evidence obtained
through discovery, primarily as a result of the uncertainty associated
with foretelling how a jury might decide the case.
The SJT overcomes this valuation gap by providing an important
clue as to how a typical jury would respond. In theory, the verdict im-
pacts the attorneys' bargaining positions-a proposition that at first
glance seems perfectly plausible. A plaintiff's lawyer cannot as easily
contend that a case is worth $1 million when a summary jury has just
awarded $100,000; similarly, defense counsel cannot credibly insist that
the defendant will prevail on liability after a summary jury finds negli-
gence. To supplement this effect, the attorneys and parties are usually
encouraged after the summary verdict has been rendered to meet with
the jurors to inquire into their thought processes. This debriefing pro-
vides additional input to assist the attorneys in predicting what a real
jury might do. 37 The quality of the jury's result or decisionmaking pro-
cess is obviously important; the SJT will be effective under this theory
only to the extent that litigants value the verdict as a fair reflection of
what a "real" jury would do.
38
36. For support of the proposition that many trials represent failures of negotiation, see Robert
Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model ofStrategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
37. See QUARLES, supra note 17, at 236 ("During this debriefing, the parties obtain firsthand
knowledge of juror attitudes and gain some sense of the time risks of litigation."); Susan Tillotson,
Note, Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1069, 1073
(1989) (noting that discussion with jurors is "unique to summary jury trials and often forms the basis
for settlement negotiations"). But see Associated Pa. Constructors v. Jannetta, 738 F. Supp. 891,
895-96 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (describing SJT procedures in which follow-up with jurors was limited to
"leading questions which are susceptible of a yes or no answer or a dollar figure" and that no ques-
tions "shall be asked which would require an answer disclosing the personal view of any jury
member").
38. See Peterson, supra note 24, at 31 ("Perceived predictive force is the key: If the parties do
not believe that the verdict is predictive, the use of an SJT as a settlement tool is pointless."). This
point does not require that the parties accept summary verdicts as exact replications of what tradi-
tional juries might award. If the parties acknowledge that a particular SJT verdict was probably
influenced by the exclusion or inclusion of certain evidence, the advisory verdict can be appropri-
ately discounted or inflated during the course of the subsequent negotiations.
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2. Party Enlightenment/Cathartic Impact. SJTs are also believed
to be effective because the clients are required to attend in the hope that
viewing a balanced presentation of the evidence will incline them toward
settlement.3 9 By hearing both sides of the issues without the filtering of
information by their attorneys, clients may, for the first time, be forced to
acknowledge the strength of opposing positions or the weaknesses of
their own.40 Although this may reflect the natural difficulties that dispu-
tants have in developing an appreciation for an opponents' position, SJT
advocates also suspect that some attorneys fail to provide adequate infor-
mation to clients, and that this problem can be overcome by the SJT.
A related assertion is that the SJT will have a cathartic effect on the
litigants. By being provided a "day in court," litigants are more likely to
settle, even if the summary verdict does not convince parties to rethink
the merits of their position. The satisfaction of having had their concerns
considered is often a sufficient spur for litigants to revisit the question of
settlement.41
3. The Scheduling Impact. Another view is that merely schedul-
ing a case for an SJT may result in settlement. Because some attorneys
do little preparation without prodding, establishing a firm date for trial-
even a non-binding one-forces attorneys to review the merits of the
case, which might serve to change their appraisal of the likely outcome.42
On a more practical level, the ministerial acts of preparing for an SJT
39. On the necessity of parties attending the SJT, see PROVINE, supra note 5, at 74 (noting a
consensus that "[c]lients or other persons with full authority to settle the case must be present if the
process is to be effective"); Brenneman & Wesoloski, supra note 3, at 889 ("It is essential that the
principals ... have an opportunity to see and hear a presentation of their opponent's arguments as
well as their own, and to personally gauge the impact of the case on the jury."). See generally G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (uphold-
ing authority of district judge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to require presence of client
representative with authority to settle at pre-trial conference).
40. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 74 (noting that an SJT is "ideally designed to convince a
client that the likelihood of prevailing at trial is not as great as the client perceives it to be" and thus
serves to overcome any attorney-client communications problems).
41. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 50 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (discussing how SJTs
satisfy the litigants' "psychological need for a confrontation" and "provide a therapeutic release of
this emotion"); see also Lambros, supra note 5, at 53 ("The psychological satisfaction of courtroom
combat is important to many litigants.").
42. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 222 (noting that analysis of settlement rates in a mandatory SJT
program "reinforces the opinion that the scheduling of a firm trial date (albeit a summary jury trial
date) encourages the parties to enter into serious settlement discussions, thereby accelerating the
decision to settle"); Lambros, supra note 7, at 799 (suggesting that preparation for an SIT creates
tensions similar to a regular trial so that the "shadow of an approaching summary jury trial will
intensify" the parties' settlement efforts); cf. Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449
(M.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that many attorneys are ill-prepared for trial, and that "[tihe reality is that
too many will not get ready until the day of a trial; a summary trial forces that day and that
preparation").
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provide occasions for contact between opposing counsel and clients (such
as during pre-SJT conferences) that might facilitate negotiations.
4. The Fear/Exhaustion Factor. A final projected impact, one
not as loudly proclaimed as the others, is that SJTs foster settlement by
providing litigants with an exposure to the vagaries and expense of the
jury system that tends to discourage interest in further litigation. Thus,
even if a summary jury result is irrational, it may function to highlight
the inherent risk associated with juries.43 Similarly, because the SJT pro-
cess admittedly entails some expense, the parties will realize that the
"real" trial will be even more costly.44 In either case, the result is to
foster a greater willingness to end the dispute.
The above review of the sundry explanations offered to illuminate
the SJT's settlement-enhancing powers permits several preliminary ob-
servations. First, the importance of the quality of the summary jury's
decision varies considerably among the differing theories. Under the pre-
view theory, for example, the quality of the summary verdict is essential;
the theory is premised upon the assumption that the result will serve as a
valid predictor of what a "real" jury would award. For the other ap-
proaches, the quality of the decision is less important. The party enlight-
enment effect--especially its reliance on the SJT's cathartic qualities-is
43. See, eg., QUARLES, supra note 17, at 233 (noting that the SJT forces parties to observe how
difficult it is to present their case, after which "they gain a greater sense of the risks of litigation and,
often, demonstrate a greater willingness to settle"). The need to concoct such a theory was in part
caused by the widely reported result in Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516
(W.D. Mich. 1987), a major product liability case subjected to an SJT format employing two differ-
ent jury panels. See Clifford J. Zatz, Toxic Tort Case Unlikely to Have Settled Without Summary
Jury Trial, Lawyer Says, 2 ALTERNATIVE Disp. RESOL. REP. 145 (1988). One summary jury found
for the plaintiff in the amount of $2.8 million; the second found for the defendant. The case subse-
quently settled, and the judge deemed the process a success because it "demonstrated to both sides
that they might win the case at a full trial on the merits, yet also risk defeat as shown by the
inconsistency of the verdict in the summary jury trial." Richard D. Enslen, Summary Jury Trials
Can Help Settlement in Toxic Tort Cases, 2 ALTERNATIVE Disp. REsOL. REP. 46 (1988). See
Kratz, supra note 12, at 847 (noting that divergent results in Stites may have served to "guarantee"
settlement because "'[e]ach party could leave the courtroom feeling as if it could win at trial, yet
well aware of the risks' ") (quoting the defense attorney in Stites). For additional discussion of
Stites, see Maatman, supra note 5, at 464-67; see also Compressed Gas Corp. v. United States Steel
Corp., 857 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1988) (following award of $200,000 by summary jury, conven-
tional trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff of $1.77 million); Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 617 F.
Supp. 1370, 1372 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting that one summary jury awarded $2.2 million while a
second found for the defendant).
44. See Lambros, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that the SJT is "particularly effective when the
trip through the legal labyrinth begins to tax [the parties'] patience"); Spiegel, supra note 5, at 834
(positing that SJT serves to make parties aware of "the cost of a trial on the merits, including not
only attorneys' fees but the time that is going to involve themselves, their executives, other employ-
ees, expert witnesses, etc.").
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a function of litigant participation in an adjudicatory experience, not of
the perceived quality of the result. The scheduling effect is not directly
related to the quality of the SJT result-it is expected to occur simply
because the event was scheduled. Under the fear/exhaustion rationale,
the quality of the verdict is largely incidental; indeed, one could suppose
that the more outlandish or wild the SJT result, the more likely it would
be to convince at least one of the litigants to settle at all costs.
A second preliminary observation, although understated in the de-
scriptions, is that several of the justifications evidence an anti-attorney
bent that is surprisingly at odds with the SJT's format, which depends
heavily on attorney involvement to present evidence, often to the exclu-
sion of direct party participation.45 For example, the party-enlighten-
ment effect and the fear/exhaustion rationale are justified in part because
attorneys may fail to give their clients reasonable advice or otherwise do
not communicate with them effectively. Similarly, the preview theory is
partially based on the assumption that attorneys-particularly plaintiffs'
attorneys-may have misevaluated the merits of the case because of in-
competence, lack of preparation, inexperience, or otherwise culpable
misperception.
4 6
A third observation is that proponents do not make clear why the
SJT is the preferred ADR approach for overcoming some of the identi-
fied barriers to settlement. Relative to other ADR options, the SJT oc-
curs late in the dispute's development. The process is also elaborate and
expensive. If, for example, there is a frequent need for parties to undergo
a cathartic experience prior to settlement, mediation would seem prefera-
ble because it permits litigants a direct opportunity to vent frustrations
and to explain important concerns not technically relevant to the legal
45. This anti-attorney attitude is consistent with justifications proffered in support of other
ADR methods that emphasize client control and subordination of counsel's role. See Brunet, supra
note 22, at 12; cf LINDA R. SINGER, SETrLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (1990) (describing the benefits of an ADR method known as
the "mini-trial," which offers business executives a "quick, relatively inexpensive look at the realities
of their dispute, without the filter of their lawyers' adversarial assessment").
46. Indeed, the catalyst for the first SJT was judicial frustration with plaintiffs' attorneys who
had refused settlement offers only to obtain lower awards from a jury. See Lambros & Shunk, supra
note 3, at 45 n. 16. One possible explanation for this function is that plaintiffs' attorneys who operate
on a contingency fee may tend to overestimate likely recoveries to discourage risk-averse clients from
rejecting low settlement offers. See Melvin W. Reder, Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special
Reference to Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 211 (Simon
Rottenberg ed., 1978).
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issues raised.47 Similarly, court-ordered arbitration, an ADR interven-
tion that occurs earlier in a case's progression than the SJT (when addi-
tional cost savings are possible), is generally assumed to have a similar
scheduling effect and, in addition, is probably less expensive to conduct
and uses fewer judicial resources because the hearings are conducted by
non-judges.4
8
Finally, the differing settlement theories informing the SJT are too
simplistic, diffuse, or ambiguous to provide much guidance to judges ex-
ercising their discretion to identify suitable SJT candidates. For exam-
ple, it is difficult to identify any case that does not come within at least
47. Mediation is typically described as a voluntary, non-binding process in which the media-
tor-a neutral third party without formal authority to decide the dispute-meets with the disputants
to explore settlement opportunities. See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971). Mediation formats can vary significantly depending on the nature of
the dispute, and may be better categorized as a style of dispute resolution rather than a process. See
JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CON-
FLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 130 (1984).
48. For a complete description of existing federal court-ordered arbitration programs, see BAR-
BARA S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRIcT COURTS (1990). With
respect to pre-arbitration settlements, Meierhoefer reports that between 22% and 401 of cases were
terminated prior to the arbitration hearing. See id. at 48-49 & Table 9. As with SJTs, however, it is
unclear to what extent these pre-hearing dispositions might have occurred in the absence of the
ADR intervention. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION
OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 34-36 (1990) (noting
that a court-ordered arbitration program increased the percentage of claims obtaining some type of
adjudicatory hearing).
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one of the settlement rationales described above.49 Not surprisingly, ac-
counts of judicial approaches to case selection reveal a variety of
practices.50
C. Evidence on the SJT in Operation
The conflicting accounts of the merits of the SJT procedure make it
difficult to determine what, if anything, should be done to encourage its
development. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to contrib-
ute to the debate.51 Indeed, the shortage of systematic evaluations-
especially tests that randomly assigned cases to the summary jury proce-
dure-has become a rallying cry of SJT critics.5 2 As a partial response,
supporters have noted that because SJTs were never intended to be used
indiscriminately, the random assignment of cases would fail to provide a
fair test of its potential.53 The result is a stand-off between commentators
49. The case of Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988), is illustrative. In
Strandell, plaintiffs sued a local municipality for an alleged wrongful arrest and act of police brutal-
ity that resulted in the death of their son. During discovery, plaintiffs listed numerous witnesses who
might be called at trial, but the municipality opted not to depose them. Plaintiffs objected to the SJT
on the ground that it would require plaintiffs' attorney to describe his evidence, which would be
inconsistent with the work-product doctrine. In a perceptive article on the potential unfairness of
the SIT, the plaintiffs' attorney argued that Strandell was an inappropriate candidate for an SJT
referral. See Maatman, supra note 5, at 467-77; see also Paul Mattingly, Note, Compelled Participa-
tion in Summary Jury Trialv A Tale of Two Cases, 77 Ky. L.J. 421, 429 (1989) (suggesting that
litigants such as the plaintiffs in Strandell should be permitted to argue that the district court abused
its discretion in ordering a case to proceed to SIT). It could be argued, however, that the municipal-
ity's failure to conduct discovery indicated that either local officials or the defendant's attorneys were
not taking the case seriously, a situation that the SIT might remedy. Similarly, it is possible that the
plaintiff would be more amenable to settlement after being able to tell his story to the summary jury
and experiencing the possible cathartic impact of the process. Cf. Brenneman & Wesoloski, supra
note 3, at 889 (noting that ability to vent grievances makes SIT useful "where there is an allegation
of false arrest or excessive force used during an arrest"); Richard D. Enslen, ADR: Another Acro-
nym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost of Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate
Commences, 18 N.M. L. REv. 1, 22 (1988) (suggesting that "certain categories of cases, notably...
suits claiming police brutality... ought to be considered for the SJT process").
50. One judge has described his selection process as follows: "[Tihe best way of doing it is
getting that gut reaction by looking the lawyers and the litigants in the face and making that deter-
mination as to whether or not it needs a summary jury trial." QUARLES, supra note 17, at 244
(quoting Judge Lambros). For a useful description of how particular judges approach case selection,
see Bobby M. Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 811-
13 (1990).
51. For an overview of existing evidence as to the SJT's utility in promoting settlement, see
Wiegand, supra note 21, at 101-03.
52. See Posner, supra note 20, at 374-75 (criticizing the lack of experimental SJTs using ran-
dom assignment of cases as well as the lack of any systematic collection of basic information on its
use). See generally United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803, 808 n.l (N.D. Ohio 1990) (observing
that after "ten years, the summary jury trial exists as an 'experiment,' commenced without controls,
carried on without standards, evaluated without criteria, and developing without direction").
53. The authors of the first study on the SJT recommended against the use of random assign-
ment of cases in evaluating the process: "Given the numerous dimensions on which cases may vary,
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who may argue about the procedure's theoretical merits without hard
proof of its actual effects.
Much of the evidence that is available consists of anecdotal reports
by litigants or judges who have participated in SJTs at the federal level.
A number of these reports have indicated that most cases subjected to an
advisory SJT settle prior to a conventional trial.54 The timing of settle-
ments appears to vary considerably with settlements reported before,
during, shortly after, and well after the SJT hearing.5 5 Moreover, there is
anecdotal evidence to establish that each of the settlement justifications
discussed aboce in fact has been observed.5 6 Anecdotal evidence, how-
ever, also supports the critics' assertions. For example, serious questions
it would simply take too long to build up adequate samples to satisfy the requirements of statistical
analysis" which, in turn, would "hinder ongoing refinement in summary jury trial procedures be-
cause the evaluation could not allow for changes in the procedure without jeopardizing the validity
of the findings." M. DANIEL JACOUBOVITCH & CARL M. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE
NORTHERN DisraicT OF OHIO 33 (1982). See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 76 (noting that the use of
different SJT formats interferes with efforts to study the process because findings may not be prop-
erly generalized to other formats); Enslen, supra note 49, at 29 (criticizing proposal to conduct
random assignment of SJTs in part because the number of cases needed to ensure statistical signifi-
cance would interfere with the courts' operations); cf McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,
49 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("It is true that to date we have only unscientific anecdotal evidence of the
effectiveness of summary jury trials. But not everything in life can be scientifically verified.").
54. See Enslen, supra note 49, at 31 (reporting that during a four-year period, 36 of 46 non-
binding SJTs settled before traditional trial with six cases still pending); see also Alfini, supra note 4,
at 223 (Table 2) (noting that nine percent of cases in a voluntary state court SJT program and 14%
of cases in a mandatory federal court program proceeded to trial).
55. This is partially a consequence of the fact that judges have adopted different approaches in
conducting post-SJT settlement discussions. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 75 (describing different
judges' post-SJT settlement strategies). For example, Judge Lambros does not insist upon immediate
post-SJT negotiations, believing that fruitful discussions are more likely to occur a few weeks after
the procedure once the parties have had time to interpret the outcome and after the losing lawyer's
wounded ego has had time to heal. See QUARLES, supra note 17, at 242; see also Negin v. City of
Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (ordering a post-SJT conference to be held one
week after the SJT). Other judges prefer an immediate negotiation session in part to capitalize on
the litigants' presence and the focus provided by the summary trial. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 5,
at 831-32.
56. See, eg., Enslen, supra note 49, at 24 (describing a case illustrating the cathartic effect in
which a corporate officer who had insisted prior to the SJT that the corporation would never settle
nonetheless made an offer after prevailing at the SJT); id. at 23 (describing an SJT in which discus-
sions with jurors indicated strong pro-plaintiff sympathy despite the summary jury rendering a de-
fense verdict, which served to convince the defendant to make a sizable settlement offer). In
addition, there is substantial evidence that the mere scheduling of SJTs results in settlements prior to
the summary trial. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 75 (suggesting that 30-40% of the cases settle
before an SJT); Lambros, supra note 3, at 472-73 (citing evidence on pre-SJT settlements showing
that 44.3% of cases assigned to an SJT settled prior to the summary trial). The process by which
cases are selected for an SJT appears to impact the amount of pre-SJT settlement. In a voluntary
program where parties opt for an SIT, the settlement effect is muted as a result of the parties' joint
interest in obtaining a summary verdict. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 221-22 (noting that only one of
54 scheduled SJTs settled prior to the summary trial in the voluntary state court program, as com-
pared to an approximately 25% pre-SJT settlement rate in the mandatory federal court program).
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have been raised in individual cases about the impact of not informing
jurors that their decisions would be non-binding.57 Recent SJT verdicts
have raised questions about the reliability and consistency of the
process. 5
8
The few systematic studies that have been conducted to date have
focused on litigant satisfaction, the results of which are mixed. An early
survey of participating attorneys indicated general satisfaction with SJTs,
although researchers noted a sizable dissenting faction and were accord-
ingly cautious in recommending its continued use.59 More recent evi-
dence presented by Professor Alfini suggests that attorneys view the SJT
more favorably when it is voluntarily employed than when mandated by
the court.60 Alfini also evaluated the utility of various aspects of the SJT
in fostering settlements; his results illustrate how design features associ-
ated with the SJT operate in practice to impact settlement. He found,
for example, that attorneys with disputes in which liability was an issue
particularly valued the summary jury's subjective assessments, 6' and that
SJTs helped overcome clients' "unrealistic attitudes" concerning the
merits of the cases. 62
The existing evidence, however, leaves serious gaps in understanding
how the SJT works to promote settlement. SJT proponents deem any
settlement reached prior to a conventional trial as a "success." Even
57. Judge Enslen recounts a case that raises particular concerns on this point: A summary jury
returned a defense verdict, but individual jurors later indicated they would have returned a plain-
tiff's verdict if they had known that the result was non-binding. See Enslen, supra note 49, at 23.
58. See supra note 43 (describing inconsistent SJT verdicts).
59. See JACOUBovrrcH & MOORE, supra note 53, at 32 (concluding that the SJT should only
be employed in a narrow proffile of disputes). The authors surveyed attorney opinions in 37 non-
binding cases in the Northern District of Ohio in which the court ordered an SJT to be conducted.
Most attorneys who participated in an SJT viewed the process as an adequate substitute for trial,
although about one-third expressed the opinion that it was inadequate or very poor. Id. at 12 (Table
2). Those attorneys who had lost and went on to trial were particularly negative about the proce-
dure. See id. at 20. Significantly, most of the attorneys whose cases settled prior to SJT did not
believe that assigning the case had affected the disposition, thus calling into question any unique
value of the SJT under the posited "scheduling effect." Id at 16. The authors concluded that the
process was sufficiently useful to continue experimentation since it "results in settlement in a sub-
stantial proportion of instances," and that many attorneys believed it had created a useful impetus
favoring settlement. See id. at 31.
60. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 233-34. The negative reaction observed by Alfini with respect to
the mandatory Florida federal court experience, however, may well be overstated. The cases re-
viewed were part of a unique-and probably ill-advised--court program that required all lengthy
cases that had been pending for a certain period of time to be submitted to an SJT without a particu-
larized determination that the case was well suited, and without discussions with the parties. See id.
at 218-29. This probably caused the referral of some cases that were inappropriate, resulting in a
higher level of dissatisfaction.
61. See id. at 226.
62. See id. at 218.
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putting aside .the question whether the legal system's interest in promot-
ing settlement is appropriate, 63 it is illogical to assume a causal relation-
ship between an SJT and a settlement simply because the dispute settles;
a summary verdict may have played only a minor role in comparison to
other factors that develop as a case is prepared for conventional trial.
Nor can much support be gleaned from reports indicating that most at-
torneys or parties found the SJT "helpful" in subsequent negotiations
without a more specific understanding of how the process or verdict con-
tributed to the subsequent negotiations. The failure to confront key is-
sues such as the reliability of SJT verdicts, the quality of summary juries'
deliberations in light of the abbreviated evidence presented, 64 the actual
use by litigants of advisory results, the costs of preparing for and con-
ducting SJTs, and the dynamics of the post-SJT settlement process repre-
sent serious shortcomings in our understanding of its supposed strengths.
Against this shadowy background of incomplete information, this
Article presents evidence derived from two different studies. The first
study, discussed in Part II, provides a comprehensive review of an exper-
imental program to promote the use of SJTs in the North Carolina state
courts. This detailed overview-the first comprehensive depiction of the
use of SJTs in a state court setting-provides a basis for addressing sev-
eral important policy issues relating to the SJT, including: (1) evaluating
its potential as a voluntary process; (2) assessing its utility in the state
court setting; and (3) exploring design modifications to maximize its po-
tential benefits. To be sure, the study is itself limited; the voluntary na-
ture of the North Carolina program did not generate a sufficient number
of SJTs to provide clear insights into some of the more vexing questions
about how the process functions. The second study, discussed in Part
III, approaches the analysis from a wholly different perspective by ana-
lyzing a particular type of litigation-medical malpractice cases. 65 This
study attempts to determine what role SJTs might potentially play in
63. See Fiss, supra note 35; Galanter, supra note 35.
64. Jacoubovitch & Moore surveyed juror reaction to the process, and noted a wide variation in
juror opinion as to whether the summary presentations affected the results. See JACOUBOVITCH &
MOORE, supra note 53, at 22 (noting juror comments such as "[t]oo much seemed left unsaid and
not enough facts made absolutely clear" during SJT process). Examining the summary jury's delib-
erative process would seem particularly amenable to study. Cf Rowland, supra note 6, at 1088-101
(suggesting several areas in which the SJT format might negatively impact juror's cognitive and
deliberative function and urging that research was needed to assess how jurors process the informa-
tion presented during SJTs). Because SJTs are short, it is possible for researchers to observe the SJT,
as well as the jury deliberations and any post-SJT discussions with jurors. Concerns of interference
with the jury's function are mitigated by the SJT's non-binding nature. As an example of the benefits
of a focused examination of a jury's deliberative process, see MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY Picus, THE
DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT AsBESTOS CASE (1987).
65. See infra notes 126-59 and accompanying text.
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dealing with the acknowledged litigation problems in that context.
Drawing upon a rich study of all malpractice cases filed over a three-year
period in North Carolina, this analysis permits an assessment of the max-
imum potential utility of the SJT process and also reveals the risks in-
volved in granting courts the power to mandate the use of SJTs.
II. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL IN THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE
COURT SYSTEM
A. Program Design Features
North Carolina became one of the first states to establish a formal
SJT program. when in June, 1987, the state Supreme Court authorized
the use of the SJT in three of the state's thirty-four judicial districts.
66 It
was hoped that the SJT program could capitalize on the perceived suc-
cess in implementing court-ordered arbitration programs in both the
state and federal courts in North Carolina. 67 Few North Carolina attor-
neys, however, had any direct experience with SJTs; when the state pro-
gram commenced in 1987, only a few SJTs had been conducted in North
Carolina's federal courts.68 Perhaps as a result of the lack of experience,
judges were not authorized to mandate the use of summary juries.
69
The North Carolina Supreme Court selected urban districts for the
pilot program, assuming that their dockets would include more complex
66. Support for the program was provided by the North Carolina Bar Association's Dispute
Resolution Committee. See North Carolina Bar Promotes Summary Jury Trials in Ongoing ADR
Effort, I ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. REP. 181 (1987). The Committee also organized a series of
educational programs for local bar associations and developed a manual that provided an overview
of the process as well as sample judicial orders for instituting the procedure. See NORTH CAROLINA
BAR AWS'N, INTRODUCING [THE] SUMMARY JURY TRIAL TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE SUPE-
RIOR COURT (1987) [hereinafter INTRODUCING SJT].
67. For an overview of the history of the state court-ordered arbitration program, see NORTH
CAROLINA BAR ASS'N, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION: REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA (1989) [hereinafter COURT-ORDERED ARBrrRATION]; see also Stevens H. Clarke
et al., Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Case Outcomes and Litigant Satisfaction, 14
JUST. SYs. J. 154 (1991).
68. Although there is no official listing of SJTs conducted in the North Carolina federal courts,
informal reports suggest that only two had been held as of June 1987.
69. It is not clear why the program's architects elected to rely on voluntary referrals in light of
the SyT's mandatory nature in the federal courts. The manual prepared by the North Carolina Bar
Association stated simply:
It is proposed that summary jury trials in North Carolina be initially instituted through a
voluntary procedure where the judge administering the program in a particular district
selects cases which for a variety of reasons he or she believes would be benefitted by the use
of a summary jury trial, after which the parties involved consent before the procedure is
actually used.
INTRODUCING SJT, supra note 66, at 5-6.
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disputes better suited to the process. 70 Neither the court nor the state's
Administrative Office of the Courts established any formal procedures or
guidelines to help identify appropriate SJT candidates. Instead, a judge
in each district was designated to generate interest among local attor-
neys, identify suitable cases, and encourage the parties to agree to its
use.71 Not surprisingly, implementation varied among the districts, de-
pending upon the individual predilections of the court staffs, particularly
the local trial court administrator (TCA),72 who was often tasked with
overseeing implementation. After the program operated for several
years, the state bar's Dispute Resolution Committee requested that the
Private Adjudication Center, Inc., a non-profit affiliate of the Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, review the program and make recommendations
for improvements. 73
B. The North Carolina Program in Operation
1. Overview of SJT Use. During the approximately four years
covered by the study, SJTs were conducted in seventeen cases. Table 1
70. The selected districts, which included the two districts with the largest caseloads in the
state, were Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), Wake County (Raleigh), and Buncombe County
(Asheville).
71. See INTRODUCING SJT, supra note 66, at 11 (stating that each judge "will have his or her
own preferred way for determining whether a case is suitable for use of the summary jury trial
procedure, and for contacting the attorneys to determine their willingness to try this technique"). It
was anticipated that the first cases to go through the process would spur additional "referrals" as
word spread about the procedure. See id. at 12 ("[Tlrends in other jurisdictions indicate that if a few
cases can be successfully resolved through means of summary jury trials, other attorneys in those
jurisdictions will show increased interest in utilizing the procedure, and successful development of
the summary jury trial process builds upon the prior successes.").
72. A TCA is a judicial employee charged with managing civil dockets, improving jury utiliza-
tion, and performing such other duties as may be assigned by the senior resident superior court judge
of the district. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-356 (1990). In each district, the TCA was delegated certain
duties to promote the SJT and to handle certain administrative tasks if the parties agreed to its use.
73. The Center was asked to perform the study in part because of its direct involvement in
assisting litigants in conducting summary jury proceedings under the auspices of the state program.
Possible disadvantages of its involvement were any preconceptions or biases that may have formed
with respect to the proper or best use of SJTs. The Center's research culminated in a report on the
North Carolina program, which included detailed histories of each of the SJT cases conducted pur-
suant to the program. See THOMAS B. METZLOFF ET AL., SUMMARY JURIES IN THE NORTH CARO-
LINA STATE COURT SYSTEM (1991).
SUMMAR Y JURY TRIAL
reveals that ten of the seventeen cases concerned claims arising from au-
tomobile accidents. 74 Eleven related to determining damages, four cen-
tered on liability, and two focused on the plaintiff's alleged contributory
negligence.
75
74. This is not surprising given that automobile accidents typically constitute a major propor-
tion of state court dockets. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSA-
TION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 14 (1986) (Table 2.4) (estimating that 55% of state court tort
filings were automobile cases).
75. Not surprisingly, there was no consensus as to when the SJT process was best used. Most
attorneys tended to recommend it for cases of the same type in which they used it. Thus, several
attorneys who had used the process to determine damages stated that it was appropriate only in such
cases. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 38 (quoting an attorney as saying that the "most well suited
cases are those where liability is absolute and it's just a question of how much"). This observation
was strongly contested, however, by those attorneys who used the process to determine liability. See
id. (quoting an attorney as saying that "I'm convinced that the summary jury trial is great with 'all
or nothing' cases with a contested liability issue").
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An important observation, only partially revealed through Table 1,
is the variety of SJT formats employed by the litigants.76 Perhaps owing
to the program's voluntary nature, litigants exercised substantial influ-
ence in designing the SJT's procedures. For example, several different
methods of jury selection were employed, ranging from the traditional
process used to select a twelve-person jury to abbreviated methods in-
volving pre-trial screening of potential jurors and limited use of peremp-
tory strikes to select smaller juries.77 Different approaches were also
employed with respect to the types of evidence permitted. Approxi-
mately forty percent of the cases (seven of seventeen cases) permitted live
or videotaped testimony of key witnesses.
78
Table 1 also illustrates the surprising interest among participants in
converting the SJT into a binding process. The majority (nine of seven-
teen cases) were binding based upon prior agreements by counsel to use
the SJT format to determine the precise amount of a settlement within
pre-established "high/low" parameters. Indeed, some attorneys agreed
to the use of a binding SJT early in the litigation, well before the comple-
tion of potentially expensive discovery. The binding SJTs included four
76. Indeed, the variations were so substantial as to suggest the need for some clearer definition
of what constitutes an ST. For example, in one case, the local court officials characterized a pro-
ceeding as an SJT even though it lacked most attributes commonly associated with the process. See
id. at 34-35 n.88 (describing Powell v. Smith, No. 89-CVS-5420 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 8, 1989 (filing
date)) (Wake County)). In that case, the defendants who were founders of a church developed a
plan by which church members would turn over all their income to the church in exchange for the
church paying their living expenses. Plaintiffs, former church members who had participated in the
scheme, alleged that the bulk of the funds collected had been expended by the defendants for their
personal use. At trial, presentation of the evidence proceeded slowly, and the judge encouraged the
parties to revisit the possibility of settlement. After five days of trial, the parties entered into a high/
low agreement, and also agreed to summarize some of the remaining evidence, which accelerated the
completion of the trial by a few days. Under a "high/low" agreement, the parties establish settle-
ment parameters setting a minimum amount that the plaintiff will receive regardless of the outcome
(the low), and a maximum amount that is the most that the plaintiff will receive even if the jury
awards a greater amount (the high). The participants dubbed the revised procedure a "summary
jury trial." The label is dubious; high/low agreements during trial are not uncommon and do not
serve to distinguish a regular trial from the more extreme modifications inherent in the summary
jury concept.
77. Compare id. at 26-27 (describing Morrison v. Rozier, No. 89-CVS-609 (N.C. Super. Ct.
July 23, 1990 (SJT date)) (Robeson County), in which the parties insisted upon use of the traditional
jury selection process to select a 12 person jury) with id. at 23-24 (describing Fuller v. Wellman, No.
87-CVS-2787 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 1990) (Durham County), in which the parties agreed to pre-
trial screening of prospective jurors and restricted questioning to yield an eight-person jury).
78. Id. at 35. Interestingly, a number of attorneys indicated that they never explored the idea
of using live testimony because it seemed inconsistent with the explanatory materials that they had
reviewed. In retrospect, several expressed the belief that the process would have been fairer if some
live testimony had been permitted. See id. at 43.
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disputes with high stakes in which the amount in controversy exceeded
$200,000.
7 9
2. Understanding Litigant Interest in the SJT. Examining why
litigants opted to use an SJT provides some insights into how a voluntary
SJT program operates in comparison to a mandatory program. As an
initial observation, it is clear that the expected method of selection-in
which judges would identify appropriate candidates and then seek volun-
tary referral-did not operate as planned. To the contrary, in the major-
ity of cases the litigants themselves initiated the idea of using the SJT
without direct input from the court system.80
In surveying the litigants' explanations as to why they agreed to the
process, it is apparent that their strategic goals were often unrelated to
the supposed virtues of the SJT as a settlement process. Several attor-
neys explained that their interest was a function of their client's inability
to present effectively their own testimony. For example, two disputes
involved young children whose parents did not want them to testify in
court; the SJT provided a way to resolve the claim without their testify-
ing.81 In other cases, the parties were either unappealing, inarticulate, or
the attorney feared that the jury would be biased against them. 82 In an-
other case, the SJT was selected for its convenience in offering a firm trial
date: The litigants had been forced to postpone several potential trials
owing to busy travel schedules.83 Interest in the SJT was also clearly a
function of the participating attorney's familiarity with the process; dis-
cussions about the use of SJTs were often initiated by lawyers who were
79. These high stakes cases should be contrasted with the smaller stakes typically litigated
under the Florida state court program as described by Alfini. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 225 n.20
(noting average award of $43,767, with highest award of $150,000).
80. Five binding SJTs were tried outside the three designated experimental districts and were
initiated without any involvement of local court officials. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 19-30.
In the remaining cases, an attorney typically initiated the idea, although indirect judicial involve-
ment, such as judicially sponsored educational programs, may have contributed to the litigants'
decisions.
81. See id. at 31-32 (describing Robinson v. Best, No. 86-CVS-8003 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 16,
1988) (Wake County)); id. at 14-15 (describing Proctor v. Barfield, No. 88-CVS-2925 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Nov. 30, 1989) (Mecklenburg County)).
82. See id. at 18-19 (describing case in which attorney preferred ST because plaintiff was inar-
ticulate); id. at 30-31 (describing case in which the attorney suggested the use of an SJT because the
defendant was Vietnamese and did not speak English well); cf Rowland, supra note 6, at 1089
(noting the differences in communication theory between permitting an attorney to present the case
who is "versed in the tactics and strategies of persuasive communication" and presenting the case
through lay witnesses).
83. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 32-33 (describing Levy v. Stevenson, No. 85-CVS-4646
(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1989) (Wake County)).
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familiar with it as a result of service on the state bar's Dispute Resolution
Committee.
84
3. Perspectives on Procedural Efficiency: Trial Length and Settle-
ment. The SJT proved to be an efficient procedure in comparison to a
conventional trial; using estimates provided by counsel, SJT trial lengths
were on average approximately seventy-five percent shorter than tradi-
tional trials.85 In addition, all cases using summary juries under the aus-
pices of the North Carolina program were resolved without resort to a
conventional trial. This result is not totally surprising because, as noted
above, in the majority of cases the parties had agreed that the SJT result
would be binding according to a pre-determined "high/low" agreement.
Examining only the non-binding SJTs provides evidence of the SJT's
settlement effect. There was no clear pattern with respect to the timing
of settlement: Two cases settled prior to the receipt of the summary ver-
dict; four settled within a few weeks of the proceeding; and two others
settled as the parties prepared for a conventional trial several months
after receiving the summary verdict.8 6 Similarly, the dynamics of the
post-SJT settlement process revealed the varied roles played by the SJT
verdict. All but one of the non-binding SJTs were minor cases that in-
volved small potential damages. As a result, it is understandable that the
litigants were reluctant to pursue further litigation. The single exception
was a case in which the plaintiff suffered serious permanent injuries after
being struck by a drunk truck driver employed by the defendant com-
pany. Following a one-day SJT, the jury awarded $3.65 million in dam-
ages to the plaintiff, an amount in excess of the defendant's insurance
84. See, e-g., id. at 9-10 (describing Owenby v. Beverly-Grant, Inc., No. 84-CVS-2886 (N.C.
Super. Ct. July 13, 1987) (Buncombe County)); id. at 12-14 (discussing Caton v. E.L. Scott Roofing,
Inc., No. 86-CVS-10374 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 17, 1988) (Wake County)).
85. Total SJT trial time in the 16 SJTs that were tried to summary verdict was approximately
120 hours. Assuming six hours of trial time per day of trial, these cases were resolved in approxi-
mately 20 trial days. See supra Table 1. The attorneys estimated that it would have taken approxi-
mately 90 days to try these same cases in a conventional format. Id. Accordingly, the SJT
procedures shortened trial lengths on average by approximately 75%, a finding consistent with other
reports. See Spiegel, supra note 5, at 834 (estimating eight SJTs requiring 17 days of trial would
have required 135 days if tried conventionally, representing an 87% reduction in trial length). Trial
savings, however, varied substantially depending upon the estimated length of trial. Because several
cases involved disputes in which the estimate of a traditional trial was only a few days, reductions
were more modest.
86, Only limited evidence of a "scheduling effect" was observed. In one major dispute in which
the conventional trial was estimated to last two months, settlement was reached the day before the
SJT. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 35 n.89 (describing settlement in Wake Anesthesiology v.
Blue Cross, No. 86-CVS-4025 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 29, 1986 (filing date)) (Wake County)). The
low level of pre-SiT settlements under a voluntary program is consistent with the account of Flor-
ida's experience. See supra note 56.
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coverage. Although defense counsel viewed the process as helpful in pro-
viding the client with an estimate of the risk, a different interpretation is
that the advisory verdict placed undue pressure on the defendant to settle
because the result exceeded the insurance coverage.
87
In another non-binding SJT, the process played a possibly counter-
productive role because, according to one of the attorneys, but for the
SJT, the parties would have settled earlier.88 In another case that settled
on the eve of the conventional trial, although the SJT verdict was gener-
ally deemed useful, the relationship between the summary verdict and
the settlement was obscure, in part because of the lapse of time, and in
part because the ultimate settlement was much lower than the summary
verdict.89
On a more positive note, a few cases illustrated the ways in which an
SJT can contribute to the resolution of a dispute. For example, in one
product liability suit both attorneys attributed an early settlement to the
fact that the SJT process forced the defendant manufacturer to focus on
the dispute and the potential risks involved.90 In other cases, the SJT
verdict served to deflate the expectations of plaintiffs or their attorneys
87. Cf Posner, supra note 20, at 387 (providing hypothetical example of a summary verdict's
potentially coercive influence on the settlement process).
88. See MET oFF, supra note 73, at 10-12 (describing Noel v. Cole, No. 86-CVS-2279 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 1987) (Mecklenburg County), in which one of the attorneys felt compelled to
proceed with the SIT after having agreed to its use).
89. In fact, the SJT verdict complicated one aspect of the final settlement. The case involved a
worker who was killed in a fall at a construction site. The defendants believed they had a strong
contributory negligence claim. The summary jury rejected the defense's claim and awarded plaintiff
$80,000-well in excess of defendants' $10,000 pre-trial offer. In response, the defendants increased
their offer, but continued to believe that they had a strong contributory negligence argument that
would fare better at trial where live testimony would be permitted. Based on the verdict, however,
plaintiff's worker's compensation carrier asserted a subrogation claim, apparently not understanding
its non-binding nature. It took several months to achieve a settlement, in part owing to the need to
obtain the worker's compensation carrier's acquiescence. Id. at 9-10 (describing Owenby v. Beverly-
Grant, Inc., No. 84-CVS-2886 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 13, 1987) (Buncombe County)).
90. See id. at 12-13 (describing Montgomery v. Lowe's, Inc., No. 87-CVS-1784 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Oct. 26, 1987) (Buncombe County), and noting that the attorneys believed that the SJT pro-
moted settlement "by providing an occasion for a responsible official from the manufacturer to be in
direct contact with plaintiffs' counsel"). Interestingly, this occurred despite the fact that the defense
counsel believed that if the SJT had proceeded to verdict, the advisory verdict probably would not
have been helpful given the limitations of the SJT process in light of the complexity of the case. Id.
at 13.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:806
about the value of the case,91 or to establish a point of reference for fu-
ture settlement negotiations despite concerns with or criticisms of the
process by one or more parties.
92
4. Litigant Satisfaction. Based upon comprehensive interviews, 93
attorney participants and judges expressed enthusiasm about their exper-
iences. 94 They also reported that the litigants were generally satisfied; as
one attorney noted, "the litigant had their day in court, and the case was
over. They didn't have to worry about it any more. The clients seemed
very satisfied." s95 Jurors also reacted favorably to the process. 96
91. In a case involving an injury following a fall at a construction site in which the defendant
raised an issue of contributory negligence, the parties were approximately $100,000 apart, with the
defendant only willing to offer $5,000 as a "nuisance value" settlement. The summary jury found
that the plaintiffwas contributorily negligent. The plaintiff then agreed to settle for the pre-SJT offer
made by the defendant. Plaintiff's counsel stated that the process was an important step in educat-
ing the plaintiff on the value of the case. See id. at 13-14 (describing Caton v. E.L. Scott Roofing
Co., No. 86-CVS-10374 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 17, 1988) (Wake County)).
92. In one case, a pro-plaintiff SJT result was perceived by defense counsel as a "worst case
scenario" owing to liberal inclusion of evidence that possibly would have been excluded at trial. The
case was peculiar. A woman had been hurt in a car accident and after receiving emergency treat-
ment was permitted to go home. She fell at home, and her family did not provide any immediate
assistance, letting her lie on the floor for several days. Eventually, she was hospitalized, and in her
suit against the driver of the car, she claimed the expenses associated with the second hospitalization
as damages. The defendant attributed these injuries to her fall at home. The summary jury awarded
$10,000. Following relatively extensive post-SJT discussions, a settlement was reached for $9000.
See id. at 18-19 (describing Baxter v. Scott, No. 89-CVS-9780 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 1990)
(Mecklenburg County)).
93. Attorneys involved in all the North Carolina SJTs were interviewed to explore their assess-
ments of various aspects of the program. Because of the small number of SJTs and the variety of
formats employed, no efforts have been made to quantify the findings.
94. The following quote from an attorney illustrates the positive comments that were heard:
It was clearly the best [ADR method] that I have been involved with so far. Most of these
procedures involve submitting the case to a single arbitrator on oral testimony or through
written submissions. This last procedure is particularly unattractive to me ... I remain a
strong believer in the value of exposing any case to the collective wisdom of twelve jurors
for resolution rather than one fact finder whose particular views are not subject to any
moderation.
The primary advantage of the process is that it maximizes understanding and the
effectiveness of testimony. You can organize testimony far more effectively and persua-
sively. Second, it gives the client their 'day in court' in a more relaxed and less stressful
manner. Third, it can save tremendous amounts of time and resources for the lawyer,
which may translate into less expense for the client....
Clients get a better feel (better than a prognosis based on prior experience) of a likely
outcome if tried.., here's what'll happen if you risk trying this. That's what happened
here-it made an impression. It makes it easier to tell superiors to write the check.
METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 37.
95. Id.
96. See id. But see id. at 38 (quoting one attorney who indicated that some members of the
summary jury were "upset that they had not heard from the plaintiff" and as a result believed that
they had not heard "the whole story").
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Some participants, however, reacted negatively to the procedure. 97
In at least six cases, one or both attorneys raised significant complaints as
to how the SJT had functioned. These complaints included insufficient
time to prepare, unfair use of summarized evidence by opposing counsel,
lack of clear guidelines as to what evidence would be permitted, and in-
ability to obtain court rulings on evidentiary issues prior to the summary
trial.98 Although such criticisms may simply reflect typical implementa-
tion problems associated with an experimental program, the concerns
also reveal difficulties inherent in a process that relies primarily on attor-
ney summaries of evidence in lieu of live testimony.
5. SJT and Cost Savings. Most, but not all, of the attorneys sur-
veyed reported that the SJT generated cost savings to them or their cli-
ents.99 Cost efficiencies were reported with respect to case preparation,
with more significant reductions attributable to reduced trial lengths and
because witnesses did not have to testify. Although it may seem axio-
matic that a shortened trial would reduce costs, this assumption does not
necessarily follow.lc ° For example, although the costs associated with
conducting the summary trial will almost certainly be lower than those
associated with a traditional trial (due to the reduction in trial length),
preparation costs may not be significantly lower because extensive prepa-
ration may still be required for an SJT. In addition, any realized cost
savings may be insignificant, especially if the decision to utilize the SJT is
97. The dissenting assessments were well summed up by one attorney:
I didn't like the process. It's an unusual thing for a lawyer to play so many roles in a case.
Here, the lawyer was everything-witness, lawyer, expert. Second, the credibility of wit-
nesses can't be determined by witness affidavits. And third, this took more time to prepare,
scattering about to get and share affidavits instead of prepping the witnesses and just trying
the case.
Id. Others noted that they would have preferred using another form of ADR. For example, one
attorney indicated that non-binding arbitration would have been better suited to his case because it
would have avoided the additional time and stress associated with preparing for an SJT. See id
98. See, eg., id at 15-17 (describing case in which attorney complained that the guidelines
were not definite enough); id at 12-13 (describing Montgomery v. Lowe's, Inc., No. 89-CVS-1784
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1987) (Buncombe County), in which evidentiary rules concerning presenta-
tion of expert witness testimony were not clearly established, resulting in severe disagreement over
the use of videotaped testimony).
99. No effort was made in the study to quantify or verify any cost savings reported by the
attorneys.
100. To date, studies have not been able to isolate any cost savings associated with the use of
SJTs. See Enslen, supra note 49, at 30 (noting that it is not possible on the basis of current evidence
to determine whether litigants save money by using SJTs). Several researchers have asked attorneys
whether they believed that the process generated cost savings; their responses suggest that modest
savings have been achieved in most cases. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 231 (Table 8) (noting that 78%
of attorneys in the voluntary state court program believed that the use of SJT generated cost savings,
as compared to 57% in the mandatory federal court program who reported that they spent more
time).
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not made until after expensive discovery is completed. Indeed, there
were cases in which the attorneys reported that they spent more time
(and thus incurred greater expense) in preparing and trying an SJT than
if the case had been tried conventionally. 10 1
C. Understanding the Lack of Use
The most salient observation drawn from the North Carolina initia-
tive was the limited use of the summary jury process. Despite considera-
ble efforts to publicize the project, to conduct special educational
programs, and to commit judicial resources to encourage its use, the
number of SITs conducted fell well belbw expectations.10 2 For a variety
of reasons, translating the federal court's generally positive experience
with SJTs to the North Carolina state court system proved difficult. 10 3
The North Carolina program-which resulted in only about four SITs
being held per year-contributed virtually nothing toward improving the
efficient administration of the state court system.
The low level of activity was underscored by the fact that many of
the cases submitted to the process were only marginally significant;
under the classic SJT theory, the most suitable cases are those disputes
101. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 41-42. This may be true in part because many of the SJT
cases were low-stakes disputes that could have been quickly tried in a conventional manner. Cf.
infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing preparation time and associated cost savings
potentially attributable to the SJT in malpractice cases).
102. Proponents had hoped that at least four SITs would be conducted within each of the three
pilot districts during the first six months. Jane Ruffin, NC Lawyers' Committee Tests Summary
Jury Trials, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 28, 1987, at 4C. In fact, a total of only four SJTs
were held during this initial period. M'ZLOFF, supra note 73, at A-1. See generally Gary L.
Wright, Lawyers Shun Experiment with Faster Trials, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Dec. 20, 1987, at IC
(quoting the director of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts as saying that
"[n]one of the three districts has lived up to our expectations and hopes"). It was expected that the
pace would increase as more attorneys learned about the procedure through ongoing educational
efforts or from satisfied attorneys involved in those SJTs that had been conducted. See id. at 3C. In
1988, the first full year of the program, only two SJTs were conducted. METZLOFF, supra note 73, at
A-I. In 1989, four SJTs were conducted, two of which were major disputes that involved over a
million dollars in potential damages. Id In 1990, the number of summary jury procedures in-
creased to five cases. Id. Several of these SJTs also involved major disputes, creating a perception
that the process was becoming more popular. See generally Michael Dayton, Summary Jury Trials:
Gaining Acceptance, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 2, 1990, at 1.
The Center's research was not directed to determine how often use of an SJT was suggested by
either the court or one party but refused by one or both parties. None of the judicial districts
involved in the pilot project kept detailed records relating to cases in which SJTs were suggested but
ultimately refused. Nonetheless, several attorneys and court administrators interviewed in connec-
tion with the Center's research detailed instances of unsuccessful attempts to employ the procedure.
103. Cf Enslen, supra note 49, at 32 (noting the uncertainty as to transferability of particular
ADR programs to different court systems).
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that will predictably take a week or more to try. 10 4 According to the
parties' estimates, the majority of the North Carolina SJTs (ten of seven-
teen cases) could have been tried conventionally in four days or less. A
related measure is that almost half of the cases involved less than $50,000
in potential damages. Selection of some of these small-stakes cases prob-
ably reflected the experimental nature of the program as judges searched
for volunteers regardless of whether the dispute fit the standard SJT pro-
file.105 By combining the number of small-stakes disputes and the fact
that in most SJTs the parties agreed to make the result binding, one may
calculate the number of classic SJTs conducted: only two of the seven-
teen SJTs met the classic profile of a non-binding procedure for a case
that would require at least five days to try traditionally.1 0 6 In short, vol-
untary demand for the classic SJTs in "appropriate" cases was virtually
non-existent.
Understanding why the program failed to achieve its goals is critical
in assessing whether other courts-especially state courts-should com-
mit further resources to developing SJT programs and, if so, how future
programs should be designed and implemented. Many possible hypothe-
ses could explain the lack of use, including the following: (1) failure to
require mandatory judicial referral of cases; (2) insufficient attorney fa-
miliarity with the SJT concept to consider or agree to its use, especially
under a voluntary program;10 7 (3) general attorney assessment that SITs
are flawed and therefore of limited use; (4) poor implementation of the
104. Most SIT adherents suggest that an SJT is fitting only for those disputes that would take a
week or more to try conventionally given the costs of preparation and the possibility that a full trial
will subsequently be required. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 70-71; Bremer & Simmer, supra
note 15, at 314. See generally Enslen, supra note 49, at 24 ("Hardly any judges, after some years of
experience, would assess a simple two or three day jury trial to summary jury disposition, particu-
larly when other less costly and time consuming ADR techniques are available.").
105. In addition, it reflects program initiatives pursued in Mecklenburg County to encourage use
of the process in small-stakes cases. In that county, one judge developed a modified SJT format
targeted at cases that ordinarily could be tried in two days. See The All New Summary Jury Trial
Procedures, Mecklenburg County Bar CLE Program (1989). The idea was to conduct a two-hour
SJT on the Friday before the case was scheduled for trial the following Monday. After obtaining the
non-binding verdict, the parties would be faced with spending additional time preparing for the
"real" trial over the weekend, or reaching a settlement based on the new information obtained from
the summary jury. As of the cut-off date for the research report, only three SJTs had been con-
ducted under this special program.
106. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 15-17 (describing Sarris v. Hall, No. 88-CVS-6721 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1989) (Mecklenburg County)); id. at 12-13 (describing Montgomery v. Lowe's,
Inc., No. 87-CVS-1784 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1987) (Buncombe County)).
107. See Golann, supra note 8, at 499 (stating that SJT is newest and "least well-known" of
ADR techniques); Martin Klug, Note, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986: A




program; and (5) insufficient number of cases in the state courts that are
suited to the process.
Based upon interviews with participating attorneys and court offi-
cials, there was no consensus on which theory best explains the low
number of referrals. Many blamed lawyers for refusing to experiment
with SJTs. Judges responsible for implementing the program regularly
cited both attorney inertia, as well as a perceived lack of ability or confi-
dence among attorneys in conducting an SJT with its greater demands on
the attorney's forensic skills.108 Both attorneys and judges also men-
tioned general attorney ignorance about the process as a contributing fac-
tor. 0 9 One defense counsel, who had been rebuffed by plaintiffs' counsel
in several attempts to employ a summary jury, noted that plaintiffs' law-
yers were generally reluctant to agree to anything that minimized a de-
fendant's expenses.' 10
Others questioned the program's implementation. Several partici-
pants noted that a particular judge, even if an SJT advocate, would some-
times be assigned to a different district under the state's rotational system
for judges or otherwise be unavailable to meet with the parties to explain
or promote its use.111 Some attorneys questioned whether individual
judges had sufficient time, resources, or interest to promote SJTs effec-
tively. For example, participating judges were not afforded any release
time from other judicial duties to promote SJTs. Especially without the
option of forcing parties to use the process, judicial efforts to explore the
possibility of employing the SJT were potentially unproductive. Others
reported that some court officials responsible for implementing the pro-
gram appeared ambivalent about the SJT's benefits.112 Moreover, there
was confusion regarding the role of the local trial court administrator in
implementing the program, such as whether that person was expected to
108. As explained by one judge, attorneys did not care for the SJT because it required them to be
"more organized than traditional trials. The average attorney will not want to expend this addi-
tional effort, especially without assurance that it will finally resolve the dispute." METZLOFF, supra
note 73, at 40. This critique suggests that attorneys' abilities are not currently well suited to the
types of advocacy skills required in ADR programs. See Edward F. Sherman, Reshaping the Law-
yer's Skills for Court-Supervised ADR, 51 Tax. B.J. 47 (1988).
109. See METzLoFF, supra note 73, at 39-40.
110. An efficient procedure like the SJT:
negates the tool they use to hold defense counsel's feet to the fire-litigation is used as a
settlement tool. The summary jury trial diminishes the expenses of the [defendant] and
with it plaintiff counsel's leverage to force settlement is decreased, because he uses the
threat of litigation to increase the attractiveness and value of settlement.
Id. at 41.




screen cases for appropriate SJT candidates or actively try to encourage
attorneys to employ the process.
1 13
A third set of comments suggested that the low level of interest was
primarily a function of the lack of suitable cases in the state court sys-
tem. 1 4 It may well be that the potential pool of appropriate SJT candi-
dates-defined here simply as civil cases that require a week or more to
try conventionally-was fairly small in the state court setting. For exam-
ple, one trial court administrator indicated that in his district there were
probably less than five cases a year fitting the classic profile.11 5 In com-
parison, federal dockets are comprised of a much higher number and
concentration of potentially lengthy trial cases,1 16 making the potential
benefits offered by an active SJT program correspondingly greater.
Moreover, there are other significant differences between the federal
and state systems that relate to court-management practices. In particu-
lar, the assignment of cases to particular judges for pre-trial manage-
ment, as well as the development of aggressive case management under
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,117 make it more likely
that federal judges will be in a better position to recognize potential SJT
candidates than their state court counterparts.11 8 State court judges are
accordingly less likely to have sufficient information to assess the utility




116. Posner has noted that 10.9% (constituting over 2000 trials) of the federal court docket were
civil jury trials lasting at least four days. See Posner, supra note 20, at 383. Posner suggests that
even with this profile, the SIT would not noticeably impact the federal courts' rate of case disposition
even if regularly used. See id
117. See FED. R Civ. P. 16. For discussions of the evolution of aggressive pre-trial manage-
ment (of which the development of the SJT is an example), see Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 770 (1981); Judith Resnick; Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. Rnv. 374, 386 (1982).
118. In North Carolina, due in large part to judicial rotation among districts, cases are not
regularly assigned to a particular judge for pre-trial management. Moreover, the large number of
case filings precludes extensive pre-trial management of the type that would permit a judge to be-
come sufficiently familiar with the case to assess its potential utility in terms of ordering an SJT.
Determining appropriate cases is apparently a function not only of the legal and factual issues in-
volved in a case, but also of the relationship of the parties and the attorneys. See supra notes 45-46
and accompanying text. But see Peterson, supra note 24, at 62 (questioning whether federal judges
are well positioned to assess whether cases are appropriate for the SIT process because "[h]eavy
caseloads often prevent them from really understanding the case and the parties"). Case manage-
ment styles are potentially important as many descriptions of the SJT process emphasize the benefits
of educating the parties regarding the use of an SJT. See QUARLES, supra note 17, at 237-38 (inter-




best employed. Finally, the SJT process may be more appealing to liti-
gants in courts with substantial case backlogs, especially if the SJT pro-
vides a means to jump ahead of other cases in the trial queue. Because
most North Carolina courts were able to try cases soon after the attor-
neys indicated that the case was ready, this potential incentive was
lacking.
Another oft-stated reason for the low interest level in the SJT ex-
pressed by both participating and non-participating attorneys was that
the process was unfair or biased. 119 To be sure, some of these opinions
may simply reflect post-SJT rationalization of unexpected results by los-
ing litigants. The number of comments received, however, were suffi-
ciently numerous as to merit consideration.
Most of the attorneys expressing a fairness concern believed that the
SJT was biased in favor of plaintiffs. 120 Supporting or perhaps creating
this view was the presence of two very large summary verdicts rendered
in favor of plaintiffs in contested liability cases. These verdicts-one for
$8 million and the other for $3.65 million-seem especially high given
that the settlements reached following the SJT were much lower. In
neither case was determining damages the primary issue. In one case,
the defendant-owing to a pre-existing high/low agreement-decided as
a tactical matter not to present any evidence regarding damages; 121 in the
other, the issue was whether the corporate defendant had negligently en-
trusted a company vehicle to an employee known to have had a drinking
119. To date there has been little analysis or discussion suggesting that the SJT favors either
plaintiffs or defendants. It has been noted that the SJT's compressed format is likely to result in
more inconsistent decisions, but it does not necessarily follow from this fact that the SJT format is
biased in favor of plaintiffs or defendants. See Golann, supra note 8, at 518 n.128. It has been
suggested, however, that the SJT's compressed format tends to emphasize the importance of the
jury's initial impressions of the evidence, thus giving the first speaker-usually the plaintiff's attor-
ney-a possible advantage. See Rowland, supra note 6, at 1095. See generally METZLOFF, supra
note 73, at 38 (quoting an attorney claiming that SJT's abbreviated format gives an unfair advantage
to whichever side was able to create a favorable initial impression). Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 383 (1978) (noting the "natural human tendency
to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known" and observing that the
adversarial approach tends to keep an issue unresolved and provide "time to explore all of [the
issue's] peculiarities and nuances").
Alfini noted that plaintiffs prevailed in 86%-a remarkably high percentage-of the SJTs stud-
ied in the Florida state courts. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 225 (Table 3). Ordinarily, one would
predict plaintiff success rates of approximately 50%. See infra note 152. It is quite possible, how-
ever, that cases were self-selected to the SJT process primarily because they turned solely on the
issue of damages (such as was observed in most of the North Carolina SJTs) so that the high rate of
plaintiff success would be anticipated.
120. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 40-41.
121. See id. at 22 n.65 (describing Phillips v. Huffman, No. 88-CVS-2072 (N.C. Super. Ct. May
30, 1989) (Catawba County)).
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problem. 122 Nonetheless, these awards sounded a strong note of caution
to many defense attorneys, leading several to conclude that summary ju-
ries tend to overlook the factual issues that, in a longer trial, could lead
to a defense verdict.123 Indeed, one plaintiff's counsel, frustrated in sev-
eral efforts to use SJTs by recalcitrant defense attorneys, pointed to "a
clear impression in the defense bar that it's geared to plaintiffs," and that
"the word is out that the SJT is a plaintiff's vehicle."
124
There is evidence, however, that refutes the pro-plaintiff claim. The
North Carolina program included seven cases in which a binding SJT
was used to establish damages. In those cases, a comparison between the
parties' pre-SJT bargaining positions suggests that defendants did well.
Specifically, the summary jury's verdict fell within the range of the par-
ties' high/low parameters in only three of the seven cases.1 25 In the re-
maining four cases, the verdict was below the minimum payment
amount, thus constituting clearly pro-defendant verdicts. Moreover,
even in the three cases in which the verdict fell within the settlement
range, the verdict was closer to the low end. The number of cases is
small, however, and this observation may reflect case specific factors
such as inadequate performance by counsel or the setting of unrealistic
high/low ranges.
III. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF THE NON-BINDING
SJT: THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE EXAMPLE
Because few studies of the SJT have been conducted, and because
additional examination is apparently limited by the discretionary nature
of its intended use, creative research strategies may be required to further
test the SJT's capabilities. One approach would be to examine the pool
of trial cases in a particular court system or area of the law to analyze
whether the litigation issues presented match the SJT's supposed
strengths. The insights offered from this vantage point would permit an
assessment of the SJT's appropriate role among the many ADR strate-
gies now available. A focused examination of this type can be made by
122. See id at 15-17 (describing Sarris v. Hall, No. 88-CVS-6721 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1989)
(Mecklenburg County)).
123. For example, in one case involving an elderly plaintiff against an out-of-state defendant, the
local trial court administrator urged defense counsel to consider the use of an SJT. The attorney
refused, noting the reports of the large pro-plaintiff outcomes in other SJT cases. In his view, the
procedure's brevity prevented the "normal mitigation of damages" phenomenon that occurs when a
jury gets a chance to recognize the defendant as a "real person." Under this theory, jurors are
initially sympathetic to any plaintiff; only after days of observing the parties do the jurors come to
harbor doubts about the merits of the plaintiff's suit. See id. at 41.
124. Id.
125. See supra Table 1.
Vol. 41:806]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:806
drawing upon an elaborate study conducted by the Private Adjudication
Center of all litigated medical malpractice disputes filed in North Caro-
lina during a three-year period 126
Owing to its federal court origins, the SJT has not been regularly
employed in malpractice cases, 127 which are predominately filed in state
court. 128 If the process is to play a major role in state courts, however,
malpractice disputes would likely be a prime target. Malpractice trials
are on average lengthier than other civil trials129 and typically comprise a
significant portion of most state court trial dockets. 130 If the benefits of
the classic SJT cannot be demonstrated with respect to medical malprac-
tice cases which are clearly among the most important category of "high-
stakes" civil disputes regularly litigated in the state courts, then its gen-
eral role should be questioned as well.
131
126. For a description of the study's methodology, see Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malprac-
tice Disputer Imaging the Jury's Shadow, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43, 48-51.
The study examined all malpractice cases filed between July 1, 1984 and June 30, 1987 in the North
Carolina state and federal courts. Overall, the study identified 895 malpractice cases, which gener-
ated 118 trials.
127. There is apparently only a single official reference to the use of a non-binding SJT in a
medical malpractice case. See Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987); see also Alfini,
supra note 4, at 221 (Table 1) (indicating that there were no medical malpractice cases among 43
SJTs studied in the Florida state court program). The existing literature does not explicitly discuss
the SJT's suitability to malpractice claims, although SJT proponents tend not to be very specific
about the types of cases amenable to the process. See supra note 14.
128. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 107 n.204 (stating that less than three percent of malprac-
tice claims in North Carolina were filed in the federal courts). Sometimes malpractice litigation can
be filed in federal court under the court's diversity jurisdiction, or, if the claim is against a govern-
mental entity or employee, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
129. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL TRIALS 9-10 (1988) (noting in study of trial lengths in three jurisdictions that the average
length of professional malpractice trials was 17 hours, as opposed to 13 hours for average civil trials).
130. See Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Obstetrics
and Gynecology Cases, in 2 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRI-
CAL CARE 161, 169-72 (Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds., 1989) (Table 2) (reporting that
malpractice verdicts during five-year study on average comprised 7.7% of total state court verdicts).
131. One pervasive issue in the malpractice context is the concern that many plaintiffs with
meritorious claims are unable for a variety of reasons to access the litigation system. See PAUL C.
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12-14 (1991) (detailing existing evidence on the inci-
dence of medically negligefit care and the relatively low rates of patients seeking compensation). A
frequent goal of recent malpractice ADR proposals--even those forwarded by the medical establish-
ment-is to improve claimant access to the malpractice compensation system. See, e.g., Kirk B.
Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1390 (1989) (describing American Medical Association's proposal that
encourages greater access by simplifying filing of claims and by providing counsel to claimants); see
also WEILER, supra, at 159 ("The serious failing in our civil justice system is that it is unable to
identify and redress such a high proportion of the potentially valid suits that patients are entitled to
bring."). The SIT, which relies on the traditional litigation process up to the point when the case is
ready for trial, does not even in theory address this reform goal.
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A key inquiry is whether the SJT is likely to produce cost savings
for the parties. Because the SJT is designed to be employed only after the
parties have completed or conducted substantial discovery, cost savings
will prove ephemeral if discovery costs represent the bulk of the litigants'
expenses. According to my study of defense expenditures in malpractice
trials, however, meaningful cost savings are possible in the malpractice
context because the combined costs of conducting and preparing for trial
exceed the costs of discovery. 132 Assuming that SJTs would decrease
trial length (and thereby trial expenses) by seventy-five percent, and that
the procedure would also generate some savings with respect to trial
preparation, classic SJTs in the malpractice context could potentially re-
duce litigation costs by approximately thirty percent. 13
3
Realizing these savings, however, may prove problematic. To
achieve the maximum reduction, an SJT-inspired settlement would have
to occur soon after the hearing, with minimal post-SJT negotiations. If,
for example, the parties were required to undertake preparations for a
subsequent conventional trial, the cost savings offered by the SJT could
decrease by more than one-third, even if the real trial were avoided by a
last-minute settlement. 34 If the conventional trial were in fact con-
ducted, the savings would evaporate and the parties would likely expend
at least ten percent more than if the SJT had not taken place, even as-
suming that the conventional trial were somewhat shorter as a fringe
132. In an analysis of cost expenditure patterns in 17 malpractice trials, defense costs averaged
$46,515. Metzloff, supra note 126, at 56-57 n.45. Of this, discovery costs averaged $21,890 (47% of
the total), pre-trial preparation expenses (which included those costs incurred within approximately
three weeks of the scheduled trial date) averaged $10,090 (22% of the total), and direct trial ex-
penses averaged $14,535 (31% of the total). Id Combined trial preparation and trial expenses-
representing the marginal cost of trial-averaged $24,625 (53% of the total). Id.
133. If the SJT reduced trial length by 75%, the cost savings (assuming that expense was solely a
function of trial length) in an "average" malpractice trial, see supra note 132, would equal $10,900
($14,535 multiplied by .75). In addition, assuming that traditional trial preparation costs could be
reduced by 25%, an additional savings of $2520 would be realized ($10,090 multiplied by .25). On
the issue of whether SJT preparation time is in fact less extensive, see Maatman, supra note 5, at 481
(suggesting that SJT preparation requirements are substantial). The combined savings of $13,420
constitutes 29% of the total average defense costs as set forth supra, note 132. Expressed differently,
the estimated cost of preparing for and conducting the SJT would equal $11,160, consisting of prepa-
ration costs of $7570 and trial costs of $3590 (assuming that the time and expenses involved with
post-SIT negotiations are minimal).
134. If preparation efforts equaled half of what ordinarily would have been required for trial
(based upon the assumption that preparing for the SJT reduced the need to prepare for the tradi-
tional trial), additional preparation expenses would total $5045 (one half of $10,090 as set forth
supra in note 132). Even if the settlement occurred at that point (so that proponents could claim
that the SJT was successful), the cost savings would have been reduced from $13,420 to $8,375,
which represents only an 18% cost savings. As a practical matter, it is unclear how preparing for
the SJT will serve to reduce preparation for the traditional trial that consists to a large degree of
meeting with witnesses to review potential testimony-a method of preparation not required for the
SJT.
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benefit of having conducted the SJT.135 This cost analysis demonstrates
the critical importance of understanding precisely how the SJT leads to
settlement and when those settlements are likely to occur.
The study of malpractice disputes also serves to identify another
clear risk associated with the classic SJT prototype. Its proponents as-
sume that judges can ably identify cases for SJT referral that will not
settle otherwise. In practice, selecting the truly intractable cases is likely
to prove difficult because many of the malpractice cases in which trial
appears imminent are actually dismissed or settled before the trial begins.
During the three-year period covered by the study, approximately 100
malpractice cases were tried to verdict. About the same number were
settled in the period immediately preceding trial.136 As a result, the pool
of cases that appeared to be headed for trial was at least twice as large as
the number of cases that in fact were tried to verdict. The existence of
this large pool creates a substantial risk that judges who mandate the use
of SJTs will err and select cases that would have settled on their own
accord, thus seriously threatening to increase the litigants' costs and per-
haps increase the overall level of judicial involvement-a result clearly at
odds with traditional justifications for the procedure. 137 The large
number of "last minute" settlements also strongly indicates that a more
pressing goal is the development of ADR methods that offer the promise
135. SJT proponents have claimed that the conventional trial would be shorter because the SJT
would permit a narrowing of the issues, see supra note 17, although there is no evidence that this
effect in fact occurs. Because many of the events that occur at a traditional trial-such as selecting
and instructing jurors, and affording the jury an opportunity to deliberate-would be unaffected by
what transpired at the SJT, reductions in the lengths of conventional trials may be minimal. Even
assuming a liberal 25% reduction in both trial preparation and trial length associated with a post-
SJT conventional trial, the costs for the "real" trial would be $18,470 (total cost of trial and trial
preparation of $24,625, as set forth in note 132, multiplied by .75). When added to the discovery
costs ($21,890), plus the costs of preparing for and conducting the SJT ($11,160) as estimated supra
in note 133, the total cost for resolving the case would be $51,520, an 11% increase over the costs of
simply conducting the traditional trial.
136. Information on the timing of settlements was obtained in 418 settled cases. Of that group,
106 were settled in the period immediately preceding trial. It is also likely that a substantial number
of cases were dismissed by plaintiffs' attorneys immediately prior to trial, which would result in an
even larger number of cases that appeared to be headed toward trial. In addition, 18 trial cases were
dismissed by the plaintiff or settled prior to receipt of the verdict. Metzloff, supra note 126, at 51.
137. The precise impact would depend on several factors, most notably the relative likelihood
that a case scheduled for an SIT would settle as compared to a case scheduled for a regular trial, a
question on which there is no evidence. This concern might be overcome if it could be demonstrated
that judges were adept at selecting from among the larger pool of trial cases. There is no evidence,
however, that they possess this talent--especially in state courts--where pre-trial management ef-
forts are less extensive on average than in the federal courts. It is also possible to argue that the
judicial system might benefit from increasing the combined total of SJTs and trials because the
overall quality of settlements may be improved as a result of conducting SJTs even in cases that
would have settled on their own accord. As with many other issues, there is no evidence suggesting
that SJT-inspired settlements are qualitatively improved. See Galanter, supra note 35.
SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
of promoting earlier settlements before significant trial preparation ex-
penses are incurred (a goal that is, at best, only indirectly served by the
SJT).
Putting aside the concern of whether the SJT offers costs savings, as
well as the difficulty of identifying truly intractable cases, the question
remains whether the classic SJT would be profitably employed in those
malpractice cases that are in fact tried conventionally. Answering this
question requires a more detailed understanding of the nature of mal-
practice trials. A rich body of literature on the trial selection process
predicts that trial cases do not represent a random sample of litigated
cases because clear liability or non-liability cases, along with small-stakes
cases in which trial is not cost-effective, are more likely to be settled or
dropped, leaving contested disputes that involve large potential damages
overrepresented in the trial sample. 138 As observed in the study, how-
ever, the actual profile of malpractice trials differs in two important
dimensions from this general prediction. First, the majority of malprac-
tice trials involved cases with relatively small-stakes: Over one-half of all
malpractice trials involved likely potential damages of less than
$100,000.139 Second, contrary to the expectation that close liability dis-
putes would most likely be tried, a large cohort of trial cases involved
weak claims in which the defendant malpractice insurers, supported by
expert opinion, believed that the odds of the defendants prevailing were
high.14° In combination, the observed trial subset consisted to a surpris-
ing degree of weak plaintiff's claims involving relatively small stakes.
How often will the SJT be a suitable ADR response given this pro-
file? In two respects, this pool is comprised of disputes that would be
deemed inappropriate even by most SJT proponents. First, more than
forty percent of the malpractice cases were tried in less than five days, 141
the minimum length considered by most observers as a threshold for ap-
plication of the SJT method.142 Second, contrary to the common as-
sumption that malpractice cases largely turn on complex medical
testimony offered by opposing expert witnesses, approximately twenty
138. See, eg., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
139. Metzloff, supra note 126, at 70 (Table 7) (reporting that 61% of sampled trial cases in-
volved claims for less than $100,000 based upon the midpoints of insurers' estimates of likely dam-
ages if plaintiff prevailed).
140. Id. at 69 (Table 6) (reporting that 41.7% of subset of trial claims were disputes in which the
insurers expected to win on the merits).
141. Id. at 50 (Table 1) (reporting that 45.9% of malpractice trials were conducted in four days
or less).
142. See supra note 104.
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percent of the malpractice trials presented significant factual issues that
turned on a jury's assessment of witness credibility-cases generally ac-
knowledged to be incompatible with the SJT process. 143 In combination,
these two factors suggest that, at best, only about half of the malpractice
cases actually being tried would meet these initial screening criteria.
An examination of the remaining malpractice trials suggests two po-
tentially appealing categories in which the SJT could be profitably em-
ployed: cases that present difficult damage valuation issues and cases
that involve weak plaintiffs' claims. With respect to the first category, it
is clear that assessing damages presents major difficulties in the malprac-
tice context-several malpractice trials turned primarily on damages is-
sues; many others presented sharp disagreements regarding how to value
damages. 144 This observation suggests potentially fertile ground for the
use of SJTs because its proponents have specifically claimed that such
disputes are amenable to the process.145
In fact, however, there is reason to question its utility in valuing
damages in the malpractice setting. A major criticism of the current liti-
gation system as applied to malpractice cases is that the jury is unable to
value damages consistently given the amorphous concept of pain and suf-
fering.146 Employing an SJT does not address these serious criticisms of
how lay jurors award damages. Partially as a result of the few occasions
in which juries in fact award damages in malpractice cases, 147 the evi-
dence indicates that jury damages awards are difficult to predict. Even
assuming that a summary jury could make a decision on damages that is
of comparable quality to that of a regular jury (thus making the SJT a
suitable substitute for a full trial), there remains legitimate and serious
concerns about the quality of conventional malpractice juries' determina-
tions with respect to awarding damages. In fact, the use of evidentiary
143. See supra note 21.
144. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 52.
145. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 69 ("The most obvious application is the original one, the
relatively simple personal injury action where liability is likely but the amount of damages a jury
might award is difficult to predict.").
146. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal
Injuries Created Equal?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1991, at 5; Randall R. Bovbjerg et al.,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989);
see also WEILER, supra note 131, at 47-61 (describing difficulties with determining damages in mal-
practice cases and discussing proposed solutions).
147. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 84 (noting that in three-year sample of malpractice cases in
North Carolina, juries were required to award damages in only 17 cases). The low number of dam-
age awards partially reflects the fact that malpractice plaintiffs prevail in a low percentage of trials.
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summaries and other procedural shortcuts suggests that summary jury
decisions on average would be even less consistent. 14
Another area in which it has been suggested that the SJT is usefully
employed is in weak-liability cases as a means of convincing plaintiffs
that their claims lack merit.' 49 This potential application could have spe-
cial appeal in the malpractice context-it has long been assumed that a
high percentage of malpractice disputes are non-meritorious and that ex-
isting procedural methods for screening disputes, such as the motion for
summary judgment, are ineffective.150 Our study provides supporting ev-
idence: Forty per cent of all litigated malpractice claims resulted in no
payment to the plaintiffs.' 5' More directly relevant to the potential use
of the SJT is the low rate of plaintiffs' victories at trial. Although ex-
isting theory predicts that trial outcomes should tend to result in plain-
tiffs and defendants winning at approximately equal rates, 52 it has been
148. Cf Rowland, supra note 6, at 1082-86 (discussing factors that may account for different
results in SJT proceedings). The fact that SJTs often use small juries may be a factor; there is
evidence that smaller juries render less consistent decisions than do, larger ones. See Paul D. Car-
rington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 51-56
(discussing the impact of reductions in jury size).
149. See, eg., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that an SIT "may encourage the plaintiff to
take stock of the legal strength of the claim and reduce the demand for damages accordingly, making
eventual settlement more likely"). See generally Reder, supra note 46, at 227 & n.48 (suggesting use
of a neutral pre-trial evaluation of malpractice claims to overcome plaintiffs' attorneys' tendency to
overstate or overestimate value of the case).
150. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 18 (1985) (noting "widespread belief that most malpractice claims simply reflect the unreal-
istic expectations of litigious patients, who sue whenever the results of health care intervention are
less than perfect"); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack- Liability of Lawyers for Institut-
ing Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1977) ("Many phy-
sicians believe that the medical malpractice insurance crisis has, in large part, been caused by
overzealous and unethical attorneys who institute groundless malpractice suits.") See generally
Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical Malpractice Example, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 199, 203-16.
151. In the study, the plaintiff did not obtain any recovery in approximately 360 out of the 895
cases sampled (or almost exactly 40%). Metzloff, supra note 126, at 113 n.232. Other recent empiri-
cal studies reflect a similar percentage. See Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anes-
thesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599, 1601 (1989) (noting that 46% of anesthesia-related malpractice
claims reviewed by medical experts were found to have involved appropriate medical care); Henry S.
Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Pro-
cess, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199 (1991) (noting that in sample of 252 claims against a single hospital,
36.5% were either dropped by plaintiffs or dismissed by the court, while an additional 5.2% of the
claims went to trial and resulted in a verdict in favor of the hospital).
152. For elaborate discussions of the so-called "50% hypothesis," see Eisenberg, supra note 138,
at 337-51; Priest & Klein, supra note 138, at 17-24. The theory assumes that because opposing
attorneys are equally adept at analyzing disputes, the likelihood of evaluation errors will be evenly
distributed among plaintiffs and defendants. Assuming further that both parties are risk neutral and
that the stakes of the litigation are symmetrical (meaning that no party is more or less prone to go to
trial because of factors such as protecting reputation or insisting upon their day in court), plaintiffs
and defendants should win with equal frequency.
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regularly observed that medical malpractice plaintiffs prevail much less
frequently, 153 thus suggesting that the problem of weak plaintiffs' cases
going to trial is especially prevalent for malpractice suits.
Focusing the SJT on potentially low-merit claims raises difficult
problems, however. First, many malpractice cases are dismissed prior to
trial pursuant to voluntary dismissals or judicial grants of motions for
summary judgment. 154 Defendants are certainly likely to prefer an early
dismissad or the finality of a summary judgment over a non-binding ADR
proceeding occurring late in the game, even if the result was the same. If
SJTs were made routinely available, some plaintiffs might elect not to
dismiss their case early and instead seek a referral to an SJT for a chance
to obtain a favorable result that would predictably increase the case's
settlement value.155 Similarly, some judges might elect to require an SJT
in lieu of granting a summary judgment motion. Second, requiring de-
fendants to present their evidence and strategy in a non-binding setting
provides an arguably unfair advantage to unprepared plaintiffs' attor-
neys, who may benefit from such disclosures should the case be subse-
quently resolved in a traditional trial. Malpractice insurers often choose
to proceed to trial in part due to their determination that the plaintiff's
attorney is unable to present the case effectively. 156 In such cases, the
malpractice defendant might strongly prefer to skirt the SJT and proceed
immediately with the binding trial. Another concern is that several of
the ostensibly "weak" plaintiffs' claims involve disputes that could be
153. In the North Carolina study, plaintiffs prevailed in less than 20% of the cases. Metzloff,
supra note 126, at 50-53. Other studies have also reported low rates of plaintiff success, although not
as dramatic as observed in North Carolina. See Eisenberg, supra note 138, at 357 (Table Al) (noting
a 38% plaintiff success rate in sample of 697 federal court malpractice trials); F. Patrick Hubbard,
"Patterns" in Civil Jury Verdicts in the State Circuit Courts of South Carolina: 1976-1985, 38 S.C. L.
REv. 699, 730-32 (Table 9) (1987) (reporting a 38% success rate for plaintiffs in malpractice trials);
Orley H. Lindgren et a., Medical Malpractice Risk Management Early Warning Systems, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 23, 37 (noting that plaintiffs prevailed in only 16% of claims
brought to trial against group of California hospitals).
154. Plaintiffs' attorneys appear to reassess regularly the merits of their claims after conducting
some discovery, and may drop weak claims. See Farber & White, supra note 151, at 11 (Table 1)
(noting that of 51 cases dropped or dismissed before trial, 44 were dropped relatively early in the
process prior to a non-binding, mandatory ADR procedure). In the North Carolina study, 47 cases
(representing approximately five percent of the total claims) were dismissed on defendant's motion
for summary judgment. In addition, a number of other cases were dropped by plaintiffs prior to the
summary judgment hearing as a result of the filing of the motion. Metzloff, supra note 126, at 50.
155. The question can certainly be asked whether the SJT is the preferred ADR approach for
identifying non-meritorious cases. In the malpractice context, pre-trial screening panels have been
employed in a number of states to provide an early review-often before the lawsuit is filed in
court-primarily as a means of identifying non-meritorious cases. For a current review of the devel-
opment and use of screening panels, see Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 181 (1990).
156. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 75-76.
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tried conventionally in only a few days with modest expenses. This point
again raises the question of whether the litigants would not simply prefer
a traditional trial; the best dispute resolution strategy may simply be to
ensure an early trial date.
A remaining possible justification to adopt the SJT in malpractice
cases would be if these cases frequently presented situations in which the
SJT's supposed "party enlightenment" effects would prove beneficial.
But any possible benefits under this theory are unlikely from the defend-
ant's perspective. Defense strategy is usually established by malpractice
insurers who, as repeat players in the litigation system, 5 7 are sufficiently
adept at analyzing disputes and assessing litigation risks so that they
would not be expected to require or even value the insights offered by
summary juries. With respect to the defendant doctors, it is extremely
unlikely that they would value the opinions of lay jurors; the medical
profession has long been on record as passionately preferring the devel-
opment of ADR approaches that utilize more expert decisionmakers.
158
The situation may be slightly different from the plaintiffs' perspective-it
is possible that a few plaintiffs could benefit from the cathartic effect of a
summary jury and, as a result, become more inclined to settle.' 59
In sum, a careful assessment of current malpractice trials demon-
strates that classic SJTs could at best play a sporadic and incidental role.
Although cost savings are possible, significant savings will occur only if
the SJT results in prompt settlements. Moreover, because of the large
number of malpractice cases that are dropped or settled immediately pre-
ceding trial, there is a substantial risk that referring a dispute to an SJT
will increase litigant costs or court involvement. Due to a preponderance
157. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y. REv. 95, 98-103 (1974) (discussing special attributes of "repeat players" in
litigation process).
158. See, eg., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE
SYSTEM 3-11 (1988) (noting problems with juries); Johnson, supra note 131, at 1370 ("[J]uries can-
not evaluate independently the expert testimony almost always introduced in malpractice cases
.... "); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice:
A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform," 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 323
n.1l0 (1989) (noting that the SJT is "apparently ... viewed as a matter of trial procedure in general
and usually... not considered by proponents of [malpractice] 'tort reform' "). The possibility that
individual doctors may be motivated by a desire to seek trial to obtain vindication has been postu-
lated, although how often such desires are in fact made known or given credence by insurers is
unclear. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 77-79; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent K. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 319, 360-66 (1991). Certainly, there has been no suggestion that doctors seek vindication by
lay juries; it is far more likely that they would prefer to seek vindication from other medical
professionals.
159. Some evidence suggests that a few plaintiffs may insist upon trial to obtain a chance at
vindication even over the objection of their counsel. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 79-80.
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of cases that can be tried quickly or present witness credibility issues, the
SJT is only potentially suitable in less than one-half of the current mal-
practice trials. Even in those cases where the SJT is thought to be appro-
priate-for determining damages or forcing plaintiffs to consider the
weakness of their cases-serious questions remain as to whether the SJT
offers a useful, much less a preferred, ADR approach.
IV. RETHINKING THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
In light of the foregoing analyses, the key question posited at the
beginning of this Article remains: What is the appropriate role of the
SJT in developing a comprehensive ADR strategy? Proponents of the
classic SJT would likely assert that the North Carolina experience was
disappointing in terms of the low incidence of use, and that the experi-
ence thus confirms that litigants will either not think to employ the pro-
cess or that one party will block its use absent judicial compulsion. 160
The suggested solution would be apparent: To reap the SJT's potential
benefits to the court system, the judiciary must be empowered to man-
date its use. Yet, this assessment and prescription for reform are directly
challenged by the analysis of the malpractice context presented in Part
III, which demonstrated that the classic SJT's potential contributions are
marginal or even counterproductive. The evidence also raised an issue as
to whether the SJT process is well suited for use in state courts. If these
negative observations are valid, what role, if any, can the SJT play?
A. Revising the Summary Jury Concept: The North Carolina
Approach
Several factors combined to suggest that the North Carolina SJT
program needed change. The initial decision to limit summary jury pro-
ceedings to particular districts seemed an unnecessary restriction; liti-
gants in other districts had expressed interest in employing summary
juries. Of greater concern was the apparent failure of the experimental
plan to identify effectively appropriate SJT candidates. It had been antic-
ipated that judges or other court personnel would play the predominant
role; in fact, this task had proven difficult and largely unproductive. It
was also recognized that the North Carolina courts had to adopt a policy
regarding whether to allow the radical variations in the SJT's format re-
quested by some litigants. In light of these concerns and the evidence
160. It is generally assumed that voluntary ADR programs suffer from low levels of use either
because of attorney or litigant unfamiliarity with the processes involved, the economic motivations
of attorneys to maintain the status quo, or the adversarial nature of litigation. See Golann, supra
note 8, at 488; Sally E. Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Con-
cept of Dispute, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 151, 151-53 (1984).
[Vol. 41:806
SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
presented as to the use of the SJT in North Carolina, policy makers con-
sidered, but ultimately rejected, two extreme options: (1) discontinuing
the SJT program owing to the lack of demand and the concerns with the
quality of the SJT results; and (2) dramatically expanding the scope of
the program by affording judges the authority to mandate its use.
Support for eliminating the program was expressed by a few court
officials who preferred that the state's efforts be concentrated on more
promising ADR methods (most notably, court-ordered arbitration) that
appeared better suited to the vast majority of smaller disputes found in
the state court system. These officials particularly doubted whether ex-
isting clerk staffs could adequately assist in identifying potential SJT can-
didates and in explaining its benefits to attorneys under a voluntary
system. The prevailing view, however, was that because maintaining an
SJT program did not place excessive administrative demands on court
personnel, there was no reason to prohibit the voluntary use of SJTs even
if the level of referrals remained low.
The question of whether to mandate SJTs in North Carolina was
more controversial. On one hand, the results demonstrated that numer-
ous obstacles to the voluntary use of SJTs might be overcome by a
mandatory program. On the other hand, several factors weighed against
giving judges the power to compel the use of SJTs. First, the majority of
attorneys who had participated in the program, even though favorably
disposed toward the process, cautioned against giving state court judges
that authority; 161 even if uninformed, these opinions could not easily be
ignored.1 62 Second, the clear differences in the nature of the cases that
comprised the respective state and federal court dockets weighed against
elevating the SJT to the status of a primary ADR strategy in the state
court setting. At best, the SJT appeared well suited to only a small frac-
tion of existing state court claims. Third, a mandatory program could
function optimally only if all judges were both familiar with the SJT pro-
cess and able to analyze its suitability in specific cases. In fact, however,
only a few of the state's trial judges had presided in a summary jury
proceeding. 163 Similarly, the relative lack of active pre-trial management
in the state courts as compared to the federal courts made state judges
161. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 46. This expression is consistent with that expressed by
attorneys in other state court SJT programs. See Alfini, supra note 4, at 216.
162. Cf Brunet, supra note 22, at 7 ("The popularity of a particular procedure is a revealing and
demonstrable measurement."). This cautious attitude exhibited by most attorneys is somewhat
ironic in light of the sentiment expressed by several pro-SJT judges that the process seems almost a
"dream come true" for lawyers because of the latitude the attorney is provided in presenting the
facts of the case. See PROVINE, supra note 5, at 73.
163. See METZLOEE, supra note 73, app. B (reporting that only three sitting superior court
judges had presided over SJTs, the others being either private judges or now retired judges).
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less suited to identify appropriate SJT candidates. Finally, permitting
judges to mandate its use may tend to limit continued experimentation
with summary jury formats, which was widely perceived as a positive
feature of the program. 16
Instead of either eliminating the program or dramatically expanding
its scope by affording judges the power to mandate its use, North Caro-
lina decided to restructure the program. The dilemma of how to best
utilize the SJT was resolved by the state adopting a unique approach that
centered on party-initiated and party-controlled use of summary juries.
The North Carolina Supreme Court enacted a rule that encouraged liti-
gants throughout the state to flexibly design an SJT format, specifically
inviting its binding use. The Rule provided as follows:
GENERAL RULE OF PRACTICE 23
The senior resident superior court judge of any superior court dis-
trict or a presiding judge unless prohibited by local rule may upon joint
motion or consent of all parties order the use of a summary jury upon
good cause shown and upon such terms and conditions as justice may
require. The order shall describe the terms and conditions proposed
for the summary jury proceeding. Such terms and conditions may in-
clude: (1) a provision as to the binding or non-binding nature of the
summary jury proceeding; (2) variations in the method for selecting
jurors; (3) limitations on the amount of time provided for argument
and the presentation of witnesses; (4) limitations on the method or
manner of presentation of evidence; (5) appointment of referee to pre-
side over the summary jury trial; (6) setting the date for conducting the
summary jury trial; (7) approval of a settlement agreement contingent
upon the outcome of the summary jury proceeding; or (8) such other
matters as would in the opinion of the court contribute to the fair and
efficient resolution of the dispute. The court shall maintain jurisdiction
over the case, and may, where appropriate, rule on pending
motions.165
164. See idL at 43.
165. N.C. R. Cr. 23. The Comment, after discussing the history of the program and summariz-
ing the research results discussed here, stated as follows:
mhis General Rule provides for the use of summary jury trials based upon the voluntary
agreement of the parties, manifested by way of a joint motion to the court. The rule fur-
ther provides that the authority to approve the request lies with the senior resident superior
court judge for the county or judicial district in which the action is pending (or a presiding
judge unless prohibited by local rule). The request shall be approved if the court finds that
it is in the interest ofjustice for good cause shown. In this context, good cause relates to a
judicial determination that the use of a summary jury trial represents a fair and efficient
method for pursuing settlement of the dispute.
The Rule does not authorize a court to mandate the use of a summary jury trial.
Nothing in the rule, however, prohibits a judge or other court administrator from raising
the possibility of using a summary jury trial with the parties during a pre-trial conference
or other event and explaining the possible benefits of the process.
The summary jury trials conducted to date in North Carolina have employed a
number of innovative techniques. These variations, many of which are detailed in the
[Vol. 41:806
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The Rule rejects certain shibboleths associated with the classic SJT
theory. First, the North Carolina approach tacitly relegates the SJT to a
subordinate role in the state's evolving ADR strategy. It was generally
believed that other ADR approaches-such as the continued expansion
of court-ordered arbitration 66 or the use of mediated settlement confer-
ences16 7-would be better suited to the institutional goal of reducing
caseload pressures. Second, the Rule anticipates that most SJTs would
be initiated by the parties, although as made clear in the comment to the
Rule, judges or clerk personnel may continue to facilitate an SJT. Third,
the Rule encourages innovative SJT formats by permitting party control
over the design of the SJT format-a radical departure from the ap-
proach followed by most other courts that have detailed a paradigm SJT
model.168 Instead of defining guidelines for how SJTs should be con-
ducted, the Rule simply lists design features that the parties could
consider.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Rule emphasizes the
SJT's potential as a binding process. To date, virtually no discussions of
the SJT have given any serious consideration to its potential as a binding
[Center's] report, have ranged from variations on the methods used to select a jury to
limitations on the manner in which evidence is to be presented. In other cases, the parties
have requested that the court appoint a referee to preside over the summary jury proceed-
ing. In addition, the parties in several summary jury trials have agreed that the results
would be binding, sometimes pursuant to a "high/low agreement" that limits both parties'
risk of an aberrant result. The Rule specifically provides that the court has the power to
authorize these practices in appropriate cases.
Id. The author drafted the initial version of the proposed Rule and Comment. See METZLOFF,
supra note 73, at 44-45. The rule, with minor amendments, was endorsed by the North Carolina
Bar Association's Dispute Resolution Committee at its June 14, 1991 meeting and subsequently
adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court on August 14, 1991.
166. See COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION, supra note 67. At present, the North Carolina
court-ordered arbitration program has a jurisdictional limit of $15,000. The Dispute Resolution
Committee in its report recommended expanding the jurisdictional limits. See id. at 10. A $50,000
limit, for example, would have been sufficient to cover six of the SJT cases litigated under the North
Carolina experimental program.
167. The North Carolina General Assembly, again at the request of the North Carolina Dispute
Resolution Committee, recently enacted legislation that authorized the mandatory use of mediated
settlement conferences in high-stakes cases. See 1991 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 207.
168. The only limit on the parties' design was that they must submit their plan to the court for
approval. The court is to approve the request if it finds it to be supported by good cause, which
requires a judicial determination that the SIT represents a fair and efficient method for pursuing
settlement of the dispute. This may often require an assurance that the parties have agreed to limita-
tions on the evidence or taken other steps to ensure an abbreviated trial. One can imagine a situation
in which such approval would not be forthcoming. For example, litigants may prefer a closed trial
and attempt to obtain that result by renaming a conventional trial as a "summary jury proceeding"
by making only marginal adjustments in the trial format and then seeking approval for a closed trial.
Such an approach was permitted in Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). Similarly, litigants may attempt to jump ahead of
a lengthy court backlog by retaining a private judge and making a few modifications so that the trial
could be labeled a "summary jury" proceeding.
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procedure; the possibility that litigants might occasionally agree to make
the result binding has been noted, if at all, only as an afterthought. 169
How often parties in fact opt to make the result binding or, more impor-
tantly, when they should consider the binding option, has not been de-
tailed. Because SJTs are expected to be used in intractable cases, it has
perhaps been assumed that the litigants, who by definition are unable to
agree on settlement, would be even less likely to agree on a binding ADR
process-especially one that entails such a peculiar imitation of the tradi-
tional trial process. SJT proponents may simply have concluded that in
its present form, the SJT is not sufficiently trustworthy to serve as a bind-
ing adjudicatory process except in the rare case. 170 To the surprise of
program designers, however, litigants in North Carolina demonstrated
an interest in using the SJT in a binding format even in high-stakes dis-
putes with contested liability. In light of the Rule's rejections of much of
the theory informing the classic SJT, there is a clear need to articulate
the conceptual justifications of the SJT as a party-initiated process and its
particular emphasis on its binding use.
B. Justifying the Binding SJT: ADR and the Settlement Process
The theory supporting a binding SJT171 would proceed from a
widely different set of operating assumptions than the classic SJT. In-
stead of speculating as to why certain trial cases fail to settle, the binding
169. See, e.g., PROVINE, supra note 5, at 75 (noting that the SJT process is advisory unless
stipulated otherwise); Lambros, supra note 5, at 52 ("The procedure is nonbinding, unless all parties
agree otherwise .... "). A recent comment by an Arizona state court judge has noted the benefits of
binding SJTs. See Barry C. Schneider, Summary Jury Trials with Ceilings and Floors, LmrIG., Sum-
mer 1991, at 3, 4; cf Marcus, supra note 5, at 749-50 (suggesting that it is not surprising that parties
may elect to make an SJT binding given the high quality of the process and its use of juries). A few
judges have, on occasion, encouraged the parties to consider making the procedure binding. See
Negin v. City of Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (suggesting that making the SJT
binding would "obviate the need for a formal jury trial while providing a just, expedient, and inex-
pensive means of resolving [the] dispute."); cf Associated Pa. Constructors v. Jannetta, 738 F. Supp.
891, 895 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (providing that "counsel may stipulate that a consensus verdict of the jury
will be deemed a final determination on the merits and the judgment may be entered thereon by the
court, or they may stipulate to any other use of the verdict that will aid in the resolution of the
case").
170. Cf Rowland, supra note 6, at 1079 (noting that parties "electing to stipulate to the verdict
of the summary jury may be, in essence, acting within a framework contrary to key goals" of the
traditional trial process).
171. Indeed, the differences in purpose and format between a binding SJT and its classic counter-
part are so significant that the binding process perhaps deserves a different name. The North Caro-
lina rule intentionally used the term "summary jury procedures" in its title as opposed to the term
"summary jury trial" in order to emphasize the Rule's flexibility and to avoid any limitations inher-
ent in the classic process as described in the literature. The Center, which provides administrative
services to litigants interested in conducting binding SJTs, refers to the binding process as a "jury-
determined settlement," to distinguish it from the classic version. See METZLOFF, supra note 73, at
19-30. For simplicity, this Article will refer only to binding SJTs. For further discussion of the
SUMMAR Y JURY TRIAL
SJT's justification would be found in the settlement process itself. To
date, commentators have offered a variety of different goals to which
ADR programs might profitably be addressed. In general, ADR proce-
dures serve as supplements to the settlement process by encouraging ear-
lier, less costly settlements. 172 ADR proponents have for the most part
assumed that settlement of litigation is inherently desirable. More re-
cently, however, there has been increasing recognition of the fact that the
quality of settlements should not be assumed. 173 Although defining the
quality of settlements is difficult, it is almost certainly true that many
litigants, because of the high costs and delays of settlement, and the risks
associated with a traditional jury trial, are coerced into settling cases that
they might prefer to adjudicate. 174
Existing settlement theory predicts that.both parties will calculate
an expected value based upon their estimates of winning, factoring in the
costs of litigation.' 75 As a result of the increasing costs of litigation and
the uncertainties of trial, the large majority of litigants seriously consider
settlement. Even so, settlements do not always occur immediately (or at
all) as the parties engage in "hard bargaining" or strategic behavior in
attempts to obtain a more advantageous settlement within the likely wide
range of economically rational settlement amounts. 176 Many ADR op-
tions are intended to provide signals as to fair settlement figures within
this range.
177
Center's work, see Neil Vidmar & Jeff Rice, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trialt"
Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
89 (1991).
172. To be sure, the ADR movement is fueled by a variety of goals. For example, many initial
adherents to the ADR movement sought to replace the need for formal means of resolving disputes.
See Brunet, supra note 22, at 4.
173. See Gaanter, supra note 35, at 84 (Assuring the quality of settlement "is a central task of
the administration of justice. It is time to move beyond uncritical celebration and equally uncritical
condemnation of settlement and to grapple with the complex dynamics of the various species of
settlements in different bargaining arenas.").
174. This same concern has been manifested in recognition that some of the litigation problems
noted may well stem from the lack of adjudicatory capacity See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation
with a Mugger The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in
Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1808, 1845-49 (1986); see also Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of
Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833
(1990).
175. For a review of the literature, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of LegalDisputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067 (1989). The overlap
in the parties' settlement ranges is frequently referred to as the "surplus." See id. at 1078.
176. See, eg., Galanter, supra note 35, at 82 (noting that as the settlement ranges expand be-
cause of increasing cost of litigation, "actors face the problem of how to reach agreement within the
settlement range").
177. See id. (noting that increases in settlement brokers and ADR devices "testiffly] to the in-
creasing demand for signals to identify points of convergence within the broad settlement ranges
created by higher transaction costs").
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If increasing costs of litigation and risk of trial are truly creating
even greater incentives to settlement, an appropriate goal for the courts
would be to develop ADR methods that respond to this potentially coer-
cive pressure by offering lower cost adjudications that minimize trial
risks. The classic SJT does not respond to this potential ADR goal. It
does not seek to control high discovery costs or the risk of aberrant jury
verdicts. Instead, it functions by emphasizing (and perhaps overempha-
sizing) the risks and expense of the traditional litigation process. For ex-
ample, the classic SJT requires litigants to complete discovery, which
itself represents a major expense of litigation. It also risks (or even in-
vites) aberrant jury results that may alter the litigants' pre-SJT bargain-
ing positions.
As demonstrated by the North Carolina experience, the SJT could
be retargeted to relieve the pressures to settle created by the increasing
costs and uncertainty of litigation. Although several ADR methods
might address these concerns (such as the voluntary use of binding arbi-
tration), the question is whether it is also appropriate for the courts to
pursue the same objectives through an ADR procedure that utilizes the
court's unique resource of the jury. In this new formulation, the SJT is
not a means of "shunting off" cases headed to trial, 178 but rather a proce-
dure of choice for cost-conscious or risk averse litigants. Developing this
option is also consistent with the growing evidence that litigants may
prefer some form of adjudication as opposed to settlement.
179
A restructured SJT could perform this new role by offering litigants
the opportunity to reduce both the expense of litigation and the risks
inherent in the existing jury system.18 0 The theory of the binding SJT
178. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 816-17.
179. See LIND, supra note 48, at 35-36.
180. The following example illustrates a possible paradigm case in which the litigants might
consider the use of a binding SJT. Assume that plaintiff's attorney has filed an obstetrical malprac-
tice claim on behalf of a severely injured infant. Based upon preliminary assessments by medical
reviewers, opposing counsel agrees that the issue of liability is close. Proceeding to trial would be
expensive and pose serious-if not intolerable-risks for both parties. One is tempted to refer to the
risks of trial as an "all or nothing" proposition, although if one is to give credence to the medical
profession's critique of malpractice juries, the risk is even greater because it is claimed that malprac-
tice juries tend to award more than what is deemed fair compensation in other litigation contexts.
See supra sources cited in note 146. For the defendant/insurer, the risk is that the jury, perhaps
swayed by sympathy for the injured child, will award a multi-million dollar verdict, possibly well
beyond an amount the insurer believes to be fair compensation even assuming liability. For the
plaintiff, the risk is that the jury may find for the doctor, perhaps because of a subtle bias in favor of
the professional, see Metzloff, supra note 126, at 90 (discussing possibility of bias in favor of doctors
in explaining pro-defendant terminations in malpractice cases), resulting not only in no recovery for
the seriously injured plaintiff, but also leaving the attorney (or perhaps the client) to absorb the
substantial costs of litigation. For the plaintiff, a binding SJT represents trading the possibility of a




rejects the common assumption that the SJT process is intended for cases
in which conventional negotiations have failed. 181 Instead, it seeks a
broader role for the process by providing an ADR option for litigants
presently forced to settle, but who would prefer a binding adjudication if
the process could be made less expensive and more predictable. A bind-
ing SJT approach described here meets what Judge Posner has referred
to as the "rational litigant" test. 182 The process allows litigants to obtain
a binding adjudication of their dispute at a reasonable cost without the
risks inherent in the current jury system.1 83 A well-designed binding SJT
serves three goals: (1) it avoids the possibly expensive and unproductive
post-SJT negotiating process (as well as the need to interview jurors after
the summary trial to obtain their subjective assessments of case); (2) it
removes the distorting impact of an outlying summary jury decision; and
(3) it avoids the possibility of an expensive subsequent trial.
1 84
To be sure, the courts benefit greatly from the risk and expense of
the trial setting-these factors provide powerful incentives to settle upon
which the smooth function of the court system is thought to depend.
185
The large case would not be the only one suitable for the binding SJT. One could easily imagine
a complex malpractice case with relatively small stakes in which both litigants would prefer a bind-
ing SJT primarily to limit litigation costs. See Metzloff, supra note 126, at 56 (noting that in small-
stakes cases, average defense costs were 57% of the amount in controversy). The point is not that all
litigants will prefer this option; many attorneys may continue to press a litigation strategy that at-
tempts to secure advantages by outspending their opponents. Rather, the point is that reasonable
litigants might prefer to accept an admittedly imperfect decisionmaking process in return for a re-
duction in litigation expense and defined litigation risk.
181. See Lambros, supra note 7, at 798.
182. See Posner, supra note 20, at 367. Posner stated:
Although emotion and ignorance play a role in litigation, no proposed alternative is likely
to work that assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that litigants and their lawyers are irrational.
Rationality is the dominant although not the only characteristic of behavior in established
institutional frameworks administered by professionals, such as that provided by the rules
of federal trial procedure.
rdL
183. If agreed to early in the process, the approach also offers significant potential cost savings
primarily because, unlike the non-binding SJT, it has the potential for reducing discovery expenses.
Beyond that impact, cost savings may also be realized primarily as a result of shortened trial length
and avoiding appeal and other post-trial processes.
184. Posner also suggested that any ADR innovation should move the legal system in the
"right" direction according to broad social policy. Although his particular approach to appropriate
social goals focused on reducing litigation, see Posner, supra note 20, at 386, other appropriate goals
can be articulated. Although the binding SJT cannot be justified as a means of settling more cases, it
can be justified in terms of minimizing total litigation costs.
185. Indeed, Judge Posner has noted, perhaps somewhat facetiously, that the judicial system
might solve its caseload problems by emphasizing the risks and increasing the costs of litigation. See
id. at 387-89.
The binding SIT approach is also at odds with the majority of recent procedural develop-
ments-of which the classic SIT is a prime example-that have increased judicial control of the
litigation process. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 819 (noting that virtually every recent procedural
change "favors greater judicial control at the expense of litigant-lawyer autonomy"). Although
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A revised theory of a binding SIT would reject the inherent desirability
of this judicially sanctioned game of "chicken," whereby each party
speeds to trial in hopes that the other side will veer off and accept a less
advantageous settlement. Instead, the binding SJT permits rational liti-
gants to recognize early in the proceeding that they could restructure the
race without risking a head-on collision. Although one might question
the wisdom of providing additional opportunities for parties to use a jury
in lieu of developing ADR methods that utilize more expert deci-
sionmakers, 186 such a development is fully supported by the constitu-
tional protections afforded jury decisionmaking and the fact that for
some litigants the jury remains the decisionmaker of choice. 187 In addi-
tion, its impact on the court system is generally a function of what spe-
cific form binding SJTs might take, how often they would be used, and
what impact it might have on the overall litigation system.
1. The Format for the Binding SJT. A binding SJT approach of-
fers the potential for significant cost savings to the litigants. Unlike a
court's decision to mandate a classic SJT on the eve of trial, the parties'
decision to employ a binding SJT could be made early in the litigation
process (indeed perhaps even before suit is filed).188 After limited discov-
ery, the case could be tried in an abbreviated fashion in which various
procedural shortcuts-many borrowed from the classic SJT format such
as the use of summarized evidence--could be employed.
these developments accurately describe the evolution of court-annexed ADR methods, it is not true
of privately-initiated ADR methods such as arbitration and mediation. The binding SJT represents
a cross-over of these two trends. The process depends upon both the litigants' interest in using the
jury in an ADR setting as well as the cooperation of the judiciary given its functional monopoly on
the power to summon jurors. See generally Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary Sys-
ten: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts,
29 BuFF. L. REV. 487 (1980) (arguing that the judicial need to remedy court delay seriously under-
cuts various aspects of the adversarial system).
186. Cf. Posner, supra note 20 (suggesting development of summary bench trials); see also King
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 117 F.R.D. 2, 11 n.14 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting that parties agreed to submit
summaries of their claims to the magistrate pursuant to a procedure modeled after the SJT in which
the magistrate will provide "an objective evaluation, pro and con, to assist the parties in arriving at a
reasonable compromise and settlement").
187. The use of the jury in this creative manner also responds to the suggestion of some com-
mentators seeking means to enlarge the jury's involvement in dispute resolution generally. See Marc
Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 201, 257
(arguing that existing evidence on the quality of jury performance "invites us to improve the litiga-
tion system by refining and enlarging the use of the civil jury, not by eliminating it").
188. In malpractice cases, for example, insurers often submit claims to outside medical reviewers
prior to the actual filing of the suit. Similarly, many experienced plaintiff's lawyers employ experts
to review the claim prior to filing. Accordingly, both litigants may have sufficient information to
make an informed judgment of possible settlement ranges.
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Although the precise format of a binding SJT would be subject to
negotiation,18 9 there are several predictable differences between it and a
classic SJT. The litigants' goals in formatting the process would be more
broadly defined than in the classic SJT context, where the court-initiated
process is largely driven by an interest in shortening trial lengths. For
example, because the parties have committed the resolution of their dis-
pute to the process, they may often be interested in providing more infor-
mation to the summary jury than would be the case with the classic SJT.
Serving this interest might entail the limited use of live or videotaped
testimony on critical issues. 190 Although permitting some live testimony
does not ensure that a binding SJT would achieve the same level of qual-
ity as a full trial,191 it does overcome many of the criticisms leveled
against the classic SJT.192
189. Because the format is not imposed by the court (as is the case with most classic SITs), the
parties will incur higher transaction costs in terms of establishing the ground rules. Over time,
however, it is expected that a number of established formats will be developed either by private ADR
providers or by the courts themselves. Variables that the parties could consider include: (1) limiting
time for argument and presentation of evidence; (2) agreeing upon reductions in the number of
witnesses; (3) using affidavits, factual summaries, or videotaped evidence; (4) permitting the jurors to
take notes or ask questions, see Larry Heur & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical
Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1990); (5) abbreviating jury selection
procedures; (6) shortening jury instructions; and (7) agreeing upon a procedure for resolving the case
in the event of a hung jury. With respect to the last point, a clear risk associated with a traditional
trial is the possibility of a hung jury, which requires the litigants to incur the expense and suffer the
delays associated with a second trial. A binding SJT agreement should include a method for resolv-
ing the case even in the event of a hung jury through the use of some means of averaging individual
juror positions.
190. Even proponents of the non-binding SJT have suggested that the use of limited live testi-
mony may benefit the process. See eg., Enslen, supra note 49, at 13 ("There is no reason, however,
why 'live' witnesses may not testify or be extended a brief opportunity to summarize their
opinions.").
191. See Roger J. Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a World ofAlternatives, 37 CATH. U. L. REV.
591, 596-97 n.28 (1988) (claiming that, even if some live testimony is permitted, "it may be difficult
to predict whether the outcome of a credibility contest in a summary proceeding will be representa-
tive of the results at trial"); cf Rowland, supra note 6 (discussing possible disadvantages of summary
jury presentations). A contrary argument can be made that shorter trials generally improve the
quality of the jury's resolution. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119. For example, in a long trial, certain desirable types of jurors may be unable to serve
because of job conflicts. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 19-21
(1987).
192. The use of live testimony permits the jury to assess key witnesses' credibility, as opposed to
judging the credibility of the attorneys. See supra note 22. It also serves to reduce the risk of
attorneys misrepresenting the evidence adduced during discovery. It may also serve to make the
jury more aware of the human nature of the dispute. In addition, the binding SJT serves to reduce
other concerns raised in connection with the classic SIT. For example, because the summary jury's
decision is binding, the ethical criticism leveled against the SJT for not informing jurors that their
decision is advisory is avoided. See supra note 20. Also, because parties must voluntarily agree to a
binding SJT, the continuing debate over judicial authority to mandate its use, see supra notes 27-31
and accompanying text, is not an issue.
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It is unjustified to assume that all of the procedural niceties associ-
ated with a traditional jury trial are essential to a fair procedure; whether
various evidentiary principles and trial techniques in fact ensure a "fair"
trial is questionable. Litigants could rationally decide to forego many of
these procedural amenities and accept a less-than-textbook-perfect trial if
overall litigation costs could be reduced and if the risk of aberrational
jury decisions were controlled. Accordingly, the parties may choose to
resurrect other trial conventions relating to such procedural variables as
jury selection, cross-examination, evidentiary rules, and jury instructions.
Even if some traditional trial accoutrements are reinstated, the possibility
for significant reductions in trial length, and in overall cost savings, re-
main. 193 Many cases turn on a few critical issues, but adversarial in-
stincts or the perceived need to bolster weak arguments may result in
litigants making repetitive presentations or raising collateral issues dur-
ing a traditional trial.194 The binding SJT approach anticipates that the
litigants will agree to center the trial on the key issues by either excluding
jury consideration of collateral matters or establishing firm limits on trial
length to force litigants' presentations to remain focused.
One of the primary procedural rights that parties would forego in a
binding SJT is the right to pursue post-trial remedies, such as the right to
file an appeal. The binding agreement could replace these mechanisms
with party-defined limits on the quantum of the jury award by utilizing a
high/low agreement. Recent evidence indicates that post-trial processes
constitute an important potential means of controlling errant jury
awards, 195 suggesting that it is a right that many litigants might elect not
to forego. Although evidence on post-trial adjustments remains sketchy,
it appears that the various post-trial processes offer only limited and ill-
defined prospects for relief, particularly for plaintiffs who have lost at
trial.196 Accordingly, litigants might readily prefer the certainty of their
own negotiated solutions over the vagaries of existing post-trial remedies.
193. In Table 1, an examination of nine binding SJTs-many of which included the use of live
testimony and other traditional trial methods-indicates that substantial trial savings were achieved.
See supra Table 1. In these cases, the estimated trial lengths of all the cases combined was 50 days.
Assuming six hours per day of trial, the total trial length would have been about 300 hours. The
binding SITs actually consumed only about 100 hours, representing a 66% reduction in trial length.
Id.
194. See Schwarzer, supra note 191, at 119-20.
195. For a discussion of the impact of post-trial adjustments on jury awards, see MICHAEL G.
SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, POSTrRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS (1987); Ivey E.
Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards" Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST.
Sys. J. 349 (1986).
196. Shanley and Petersen found that 80% of jury awards were unaffected by the post-trial ad-
justment process; those awards that were modified tended to be in cases with larger verdicts. See
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The litigants' agreement to waive their right to appeal does raise
concerns that the parties may be tempted to violate applicable eviden-
tiary norms, which may in egregious cases threaten the integrity of the
binding SJT process. In a non-binding SJT, improper trial tactics are
counterproductive; the opposing party has the option of simply ignoring
the tainted SJT result and proceeding to a conventional trial. In the
binding context, however, this concern could be addressed by the parties
who may authorize the presiding judge to order a retrial in cases in
which a party engaged in grossly improper conduct.
197
2. Predicting the Impact of Permitting Binding SJTs. What im-
pact will recognizing and fostering the use of binding SJTs have on the
litigation process? An initial question is how often litigants would agree
to resolve their case using a summary process with admitted imperfec-
tions. To be sure, the answer will depend upon developments not easily
predicted. First, the incidence of use may be a function of judicial in-
volvement in permitting and indeed encouraging the procedure. Even
though the parties must consent to the process, it would be appropriate
for the court to play a facilitating role. Especially in jurisdictions that
exercise active pre-trial management, courts could play a useful role in
identifying cases in which the parties face a risky and expensive trial and
are taking reasonable settlement positions. If the circumstances suggest
the use of a binding SJT, the court could assist the litigants in establish-
ing the high/low parameters and developing the format for the proce-
dure.198 Use of the process will also depend to a great extent on the
interest of litigants in utilizing a lay jury. It may be, for example, that
binding SJTs would be used more frequently in certain litigation contexts
SHANLEY & PETERSEN, supra note 195, at 26-32. Cf Galanter, supra note 187, at 224-27 (sug-
gesting that judicial review of jury verdicts might be decreasing although becoming more focused on
larger awards). In fact, virtually all substantial modifications represent reductions in jury awards,
thus strongly suggesting that the process is of marginal use to plaintiffs. See SHANLEY & PETERSEN,
supra note 195, at 27-28 (Table 4.1) (reporting that plaintiff obtained relief from post-trial adjust-
ment process in only five percent of cases); Metzloff, supra note 126, at 60-61, 87-88 (questioning the
rationality of the post-trial adjustment process). A binding SIT would almost certainly be a more
effective and efficient means of insuring plaintiffs some recovery in meritorious cases.
197. See Schneider, supra note 169, at 4 (noting possibility of ordering a retrial for an unfair
SM; cf Alfini, supra note 4, at 217 (noting attorney preference for some safeguards against overly
zealous presentations during summary jury proceedings). In addition, it could be argued that the
court maintains the inherent authority to review any trial conducted under its auspices to ensure that
the proceeding was fundamentally fair. Although the scope of review would be limited, maintaining
some possibility for review-perhaps similar to that afforded to arbitration awards, see Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. II 1990)-is advisable.
198. See Schneider, supra note 169, at 4 (describing judicial involvement in establishing high/
low agreements).
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such as personal injury disputes, 199 where plaintiffs have a preference for
lay juror involvement, as opposed to business disputes, where the liti-
gants might prefer experienced arbitrators.
It may well be that the binding SJT option, even if made available
and encouraged by courts, would be used only infrequently. The proce-
dure is sufficiently expensive such that settlement or other ADR options
(such as arbitration) would in many instances be preferred. But even if
not used extensively, the availability of this ADR choice may play a posi-
tive role. Plaintiff's attorneys, for example, might be more inclined to
initiate or be receptive to the use of ADR if a binding SJT were an option
because it is more akin to the familiar trial format. During the subse-
quent negotiations, the parties may agree on another ADR approach or
even settle the dispute.
2°°
Assuming that binding SJTs are regularly employed, two potentially
serious problems may develop. First, by lowering the cost of trial and
reducing the risk inherent in trial, the binding SJT model has the predict-
able effect of increasing the number of trials. This could contribute to
court backlogs by requiring additional judicial involvement or commit-
ment of resources in cases that admittedly may have settled on their own
199. In North Carolina, there has been significant interest in the use of binding SJTs in the
malpractice context. Over the past three years, five high-stakes malpractice cases have been resolved
by binding SJTs, each involving awards to the plaintiffs of over $500,000. See METZLOrr, supra
note 73, at 19-28 (describing three of the cases). In comparison, the traditional trial process in
North Carolina during the three years studied involved only two jury awards of this magnitude.
200. To date, there has been little discussion about how the provision of various ADR options
enriches the settlement process. See generally Galanter, supra note 157, at 103 (discussing how
certain procedural rules tend to "penetrate" the negotiation process apart from their formal use); cf
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 996 (1979) (noting that further study should be directed to "learning more
about how alternative procedural mechanisms might facilitate dispute resolution" in the context of
child custody mediation).
Some evidence suggests that discussing ADR options assists in negotiations. For example, the
author recently served as a consultant in exploring the use of ADR in a major obstetrical malprac-
tice case. The parties had not discussed settlement for over a year, and were approximately $500,000
apart on settlement. After preliminary discussions, the parties agreed in concept to use a binding
SiT, which was the only ADR option that the plaintiff's attorney would consider. Following several
meetings to determine the precise format, the parties reached a tentative agreement to use a two-day
SJT focused solely on the obstetrician's alleged negligence (and excluding any evidence on the dis-
puted issues of causation and damages), together with a binding high/low agreement. As an order
was being prepared for the court's approval, the parties reached a settlement. Both parties attributed
the ADR discussions with having served a key role in facilitating the settlement. The insurer in this
dispute (who has been party to several binding SJTs) has reported that its consideration of ADR has
helped settle several cases. See MEDICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1990 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1990) ("We have found that simply proposing alternative dispute resolu-
tion often gets the discussion going again, which leads to settlements in cases that might otherwise go
to court.").
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accord. The prospects of increasing the total number of trials being con-
ducted under the court's auspices is both figuratively and literally
unsettling.
One approach to minimize this potential drain on judicial resources
would be to permit or even require the parties to retain private judges to
preside over the summary trials. The North Carolina experience, for ex-
ample, demonstrated considerable interest in that option.201 Litigants
perceived several advantages to retaining a private judge, such as greater
flexibility in scheduling, less potential interference from the courts in de-
termining the SJT's format, and the inherent attractiveness of self-select-
ing the presiding judge. By the same token, however, the use of private
judges strikes a discordant note with the repeated admonition of SJT pro-
ponents that a public judge or magistrate must preside.202 In fact, how-
ever, this advice is more a reflection of the perceived need for formality
than a comment on the unsuitability of private judges; experienced liti-
gators or former judges should be able to set an appropriately formal
tone. Although concerns have been raised concerning the use of private
judges in other ADR contexts, 20 3 their possible involvement in SJTs
should not cause serious objection. Certainly, the task of presiding
would appear to be no more onerous than the responsibilities assigned to
private attorneys who serve as arbitrators in court-ordered arbitration
programs where they must not only conduct the ADR hearings, but also
decide the merits of the case. The use of private judges also serves to
201. Litigants in five of the nine binding SITs in North Carolina employed private judges. MET-
ZLOFF, supra note 73, at 19-30 & app. B.
202. See, eg., Bremer & Simmer, supra note 15, at 310 ("To be most effective, the summary jury
trial should be conducted by a judge or magistrate. In order to have the same impact on the litigants
as the traditional trial, the summary jury trial must be administered by someone of authority in a
courtroom."); Marcus, supra note 5, at 749 (noting that the "trappings" of the traditional trial
process "are essential to [the sIT's] success; the summary jury trial must be presided over by a judge
or magistrate"). In fact, there are reports of non-judicial officers presiding. See Harges, supra note
50, at 810 n.103 (noting that one judge permitted his law clerks to preside over SITs).
A separate issue is whether non-Article III judges are constitutionally permitted to preside in
federal courts, a question that has received some recent attention. See, eg., Carrington, supra note
148, at 47-51 (noting that although it is increasingly tempting to delegate responsibility for presiding
over jury trials to non-judges, an argument could be made that such delegation is constitutionally
impermissible). Currently, U.S. magistrates are permitted to preside with the consent of the parties.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988). But see S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the
Commands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967, 1044 n.358 (1988)
(questioning whether the right to have an Article III judge preside over a jury trial can be waived).
203. See Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considera-
lions of Pay-As-You Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1592 (1981) (noting constitutional arguments and
policy objections to the use of private judges, which permit wealthier litigants to obtain speedier
resolutions of their disputes); Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Reme-
dies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 1019-29 (1984) (same). Assuming




reduce any expenses incurred by the judicial system associated with the
use of binding SJTs because litigants would ordinarily be expected to pay
the fees of the private judges.
2°4
A second potential problem with the widespread use of binding SJTs
concerns the relationship between the summary jury verdict results and
the settlement of other cases. It has generally been assumed that conven-
tional jury verdicts have a major impact on the settlement of non-trial
disputes.205 Little attention has been given to how SJT verdicts might
influence the settlement process, 2° 6. perhaps premised upon the assump-
tion that SJT verdicts provided at best a faint signal because they were
based upon incomplete evidence, or because they were often rendered in
non-public settings. 2
0 7
The potential impact of SJT verdicts becomes more important, how-
ever, if the process were regularly used in a binding format. If, as sug-
gested, a primary use of binding SJTs would be in high-stakes cases, the
outcomes would be of considerable interest to attorneys and future liti-
gants with similar cases. Moreover, several factors might result in more
information on the summary verdict being generally available to inter-
ested observers. First, because the binding SJT is a binding trial con-
ducted under the court's auspices, it is questionable whether it could be
closed to the public, as have been some classic SJTs.208 Second, because
binding SJTs are shorter than trials, it is easier for reporters or interested
204. See Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of Litiga-
tion, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267, 268-71 (1985) (recommending imposition of appropriate user fees for
trial); Posner, supra note 20, at 392-93 (suggesting imposition of user charges for court services in
lieu of further development of SJTs); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a "Better
Way" Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 896-98 (discussing users'
fees). Litigants could also be asked to pay the costs of summoning jurors to attend binding SJTs. In
two of the five binding SJTs conducted in North Carolina using private judges, the litigants were
required to reimburse the court for the cost of the jurors.
205. On the relationship between trial outcomes and the settlement process generally, see Ga-
lanter, supra note 187, at 227-232; Metzloff, supra note 126, at 80-93.
206. See Posner, supra note 20, at 388 (suggesting that if the use of non-binding SJTs increased,
thereby reducing the number of trial decisions, it would tend to make it more difficult for litigants to
predict trial outcomes, resulting in greater uncertainty that would destabilize the settlement
process).
207. See, eg., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988)
(permitting SJT hearing to be closed to the public), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
208. The justification used in Cincinnati Gas-that the procedure was simply part of an elabo-
rate settlement process-will be unavailing in the binding context. Litigants may prefer that the
summary trials be closed, however, for other reasons. The increased potential for privacy is a major
perceived benefit of ADR procedures. For discussion of the issues relating to access to SJTs, see
Andrew G. Sykes, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.: Extinguishing the Light on
Summary Jury Trials, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (1989) (suggesting a qualified right of access to SJTs).
For an excellent discussion of the policy issues relating to conducting private SJTs, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or
"The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. L. REv. 1, 25-30 (1991).
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observers to attend the proceedings. Third, because summary trials are
still novel, they may receive more publicity than traditional trials.20 9
The shadows cast by SJT verdicts would not pose a special concern
if the quality of decision were as high as traditional trials. Because of the
abbreviated nature of the presentation, however, binding SJT results may
be more prone to erratic results than are regular jury trials. The combi-
nation of less predictable results and higher-stakes cases may lead to in-
creased instability in the settlement process. In addition, observers who
are not privy to the parties' high/low agreements (which are usually con-
fidential), may interpret the summary jury results incorrectly by failing
to take into account the litigants' actual use of the summary verdicts.
210
One possible solution would be to encourage litigants to define more
carefully the issues submitted to the summary jury so that the results
were less susceptible to misinterpretation. For example, if the primary
issue to be resolved by the summary jury is liability, then the question of
damages should not even be submitted to the summary jury so as to
avoid any possibly negative impact of an unusually large or small award.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are faced with difficult choices as to what ADR options to
promote and institutionalize. In considering the SJT-a leading ADR
candidate based upon its alleged propensity to promote settlements in
intractable cases-one is confronted with sharply conflicting accounts of
its performance and promise. The classic SJT is schizophrenic. On one
209. Several of the binding SJTs conducted under the North Carolina SJT program received
front page coverage in a statewide publication for lawyers. See Michael Dayton, Summary Jury
Trial Returns First Breast Cancer Verdict, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 5, 1990, at 1; Jay Reeves, Mini-
Tial Reaps $8 Million Award, N.C. LAw. WKLY., June 12, 1989, at 1.
210. The possibly negative impact associated with widely known SJT results can be illustrated by
Phillips v. Huffman, No. 89-CVS-2072 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 30, 1989) (Catawba County) (described
in METZLOFF, supra note 73, at 19-22). In Phillips, the primary issue submitted to the summary
jury was whether an obstetrician had negligently handled a mother's pregnancy, which had allegedly
resulted in severe neurological injuries to the plaintiff child. The defendant submitted no evidence
on the issue of damages because if liability were found, the quantum of damages would clearly have
exceeded the parties' high/low agreement; the plaintiff would thus receive the maximum award.
Nonetheless, the issue of damages was submitted to the jury, who, based upon incomplete informa-
tion, rendered a verdict for $8 million (which, had it occurred in a regular jury trial, would have
been the largest malpractice verdict ever rendered in North Carolina).
Informal discussions with insurers indicated that the high SJT verdict had made settlement of
other obstetrical malpractice cases more difficult because it had established a new target figure for
plaintiffs' attorneys. Certainly with respect to the SJT process, the verdict raised grave doubts in the
minds of defense counsel as to the fairness of the process (even though the issue of damages had not
actually been contested at the trial). See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. In retrospect, it




hand, it accepts the existing dynamics for pre-trial discovery and settle-
ment, despite growing evidence that those processes may be inefficient,
expensive, and potentially unfair. On the other hand, with respect to the
trial process itself, the SJT rejects virtually all existing safeguards, and
replaces them with an emaciated version of a traditional trial. This sharp
division in approach provides fertile grounds for criticism. The evidence
presented here is that the classic SJT is an unattractive option for many
courts and in many litigation contexts.
The intensity of recent criticisms of the SJT is unwarranted. The
process remains in an experimental phase; it has in its brief history
evolved from a sharply regimented procedure used in a narrow band of
cases to a more free-wheeling and flexible mechanism. Its stated justifica-
tions, however, remain closely tied to its earliest manifestations. Too
much attention has been given to debating the merits of an admittedly
experimental process, and too little to reexamining and refining its role in
the continuing evolution of ADR procedures. The key issue may not be
determining whether the SJT has been proven "effective" as defined by
some artificial measure, but to continue to debate what role the process
may play in contributing to improvements in the settlement/litigation
dynamic.
Looking past the classic SJT's narrowly defined purpose of reducing
trial dockets, there emerges a different vision of what the SJT might ac-
complish. To date, the ADR movement-especially those aspects that
relate to court-annexed alternatives-has focused on ways to facilitate
early settlements. A different vantage point recognizes that the settle-
ment process itself may be unfair and inefficient. If true, developing
ADR methods designed for cases that are currently settling is a legiti-
mate and important task; that this endeavor might require creating meth-
ods that postpone settlement or that seek to change the patterns of
settlement incentives should be acknowledged and viewed as a worthy
challenge. In that light, the SJT-reconfigured as a binding process
targeted at high-stakes disputes-can fulfill a worthy niche.
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